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Abstract
This dissertation explores situational differences in physician behavior based on detailed
electronic hospital records, shedding light on previously unobservable determinants of
treatment decisions and processes.
I study how available operation room capacity affects operative decisions made by
orthopedic surgeons in Chapter 1. These physicians have constrained access to operating
room time, leading to exogenous variation of available capacity captured by the number
of open surgery slots. I ﬁnd that physicians are more likely to operate on a patient when
they have more open surgery slots within a week of the initial encounter. This relationship
is more pronounced for operative decisions allowing for substantial physician discretion.
These results provide some evidence for how exogenous changes to available supply can
have a signiﬁcant impact on treatment decisions.
Chapter 2 — co-authored with David Ring and Mark S. Vrahas — exploits a similar
measure of capacity to study the impact of operative delays on patient outcomes after
hip fractures. Delaying the surgical treatment of these patients is frequently correlated
with disadvantageous outcomes. Estimating the causal implications of this relationship
is complicated by the inﬂuence of unobservable patient characteristics on both operative
delays and outcomes. We address this issue by using the number of available surgery slots
of the hospital’s trauma surgeons at the time of patient arrival as an instrumental variable.
This approach results in imprecise estimates of the causal consequences of operative delays
despite a sufﬁciently strong ﬁrst-stage relationship between operation room availability and
operative delays.
iiiIn Chapter 3 — co-authored with Robert S. Huckman and David Ring — we study how
the familiarity of surgical teams impacts procedure duration. Speciﬁcally, we analyze across
what portion of a team’s members familiarity must be developed to improve performance.
We ﬁnd that team familiarity — measured by the volume of previous operations performed
by team members working together — reduces procedure duration by more to the extent
that it is distributed across more members of a team. Broad familiarity shared by three or
more team members improves team performance by more than twice as much as familiarity
concentrated among just two team members.
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This dissertation exploits detailed electronic hospital records bridging the gap between
national databases — containing a limited number of variables on an enormous number
of patients — and information collected through chart reviews, which typically comprises
interesting covariates but is limited to a small number of patients. Here, I take advantage
of data that would typically be collected through chart reviews but is available for a
considerable number of patients.
Chapter 1 uses this unique source of data to measure a physician’s access to operation
room time and to determine whether this measure affects operative decisions. Chapter
2 exploits a similar measure of access to operation room time to instrument the impact
of operative delays on patient outcomes after hip fractures. Both of these chapters are
based on observing a physician’s entire operation schedule over substantial periods of time.
Meanwhile, Chapter 3 takes advantage of data tracking the composition of surgical teams
to distinguish how procedure duration changes with familiarity concentrated among few
members and familiarity shared by many members of a surgical team.
All of these chapters demonstrate situational differences in physician decisions and
performance, helping us to understand further determinants of the abundant variation
in treatment choices. Most importantly, however, situational variation — to the extent
that it is exogenous to patient characteristics — constitutes a promising instrumental
variable, enabling us to estimate the causal implications of physician behavior and treatment
choices for patient outcomes. Chapter 2 proceeds accordingly, using situational variation in
operation room availability as an instrumental variable for operative delay.
1Physician Capacity and Operative Decisions
Clearly, treatment decisions should be inﬂuenced by patient and physician characteristics.
Besides these health factors, non-health factors such as ﬁnancial incentives and available
capacity are frequently suspected to inﬂuence patient and physician behavior. So far, there
is very limited empirical evidence on the role of physician capacity, presumably because
identifying and tracking exogenous variation in physicians’ time and access to resources is
challenging.
Chapter 1 explores how operative decisions — among the most meaningful choices made
by patients and physicians both in qualitative and ﬁnancial terms — are affected by the
available capacity of orthopedic surgeons. In orthopedic surgery, many conditions may be
treated both non-operatively and surgically, leaving substantial discretion to the patient and
the physician. I observe short-term ﬂuctuations in orthopedic surgeons’ access to operation
room time and use the resulting variation to estimate the impact of open surgery slots
on subsequent operative decisions. For identiﬁcation, the variation in physician capacity
must be unrelated to patient and physician characteristics. I focus on the initial encounters
between patients and physicians to ensure that physician capacity is exogenous to patient
characteristics. Meanwhile, I account for physician ﬁxed effects, comparing the operative
decisions made by the same physician over time.
I ﬁnd that orthopedic surgeons are more likely to operate on a patient when they
have more open surgery slots within a week of the initial encounter. A one standard
deviation increase in physician capacity leads to an operation rate that is between 1.7 and
3.7 percent higher relative to the corresponding average operation rate over a monthly,
quarterly, and yearly horizon. These differences are considerable given that I consider the
entire spectrum of orthopedic conditions not requiring immediate treatment. Interestingly,
physician capacity has a more pronounced impact on operative decisions allowing for
substantial physician discretion. These results provide some evidence for how exogenous
changes to available supply can have a signiﬁcant impact on treatment decisions made by
both patients and physicians.
2Operative Delays and Hip Fracture Outcomes:
Operation Room Availability as Instrumental Variable
Documenting situational variation in physician behavior helps us to further comprehend
the enormous variation in treatment decisions we observe across many ﬁelds of medicine.
Nonetheless, tracking situational variation may be even more relevant for the evaluation of
the causal consequences of treatment processes and decisions. To the extent that situational
variation is exogenous to patient characteristics, it may be used to instrument a wide range
of treatment characteristics — which are typically endogenous to unobservable patient
characteristics — when analyzing their impact on patient outcomes.
Chapter 2 — co-authored with David Ring and Mark S. Vrahas — pursues this strategy
to address a long-standing issue in clinical research. Across many conditions in orthopedic
surgery, adverse patient outcomes are positively correlated with operative delays. Frequently,
severe cases require more time to be stabilized before surgery, leading to a spurious
correlation between operative delays and patient outcomes. Clearly, estimating the causal
implications of this relationship is complicated by the inﬂuence of unobservable patient
characteristics on both operative delays and outcomes. There is still no consensus on how
badly operative delays affect patient outcomes.
We focus on patients reporting to the emergency room with hip fractures, one of the
most frequent conditions in orthopedic surgery. These patients are typically operated on by
attending trauma surgeons. We exploit variation in these surgeons’ number of open surgery
slots at the time of patient arrival as instrumental variable for operative delay, arguing that
operation room availability is unlikely to be related to patient characteristics conditional
on the time of patient arrival. We document a small but signiﬁcant relationship between
operation room availability and operative delay, suggesting that increasing operation room
availability by one standard deviation reduces operative delay by almost three hours, or
about 6.8 percent of the average operative delay. Despite this ﬁrst-stage relationship, the
estimates of the causal consequences of operative delays on patient outcomes are imprecise.
3Concentrated and Broad Team Familiarity:
Evidence from Orthopedic Surgery
In Chapter 3 — co-authored with Robert S. Huckman and David Ring — we study how
the familiarity of surgical teams impacts procedure duration of orthopedic operations.
Speciﬁcally, we analyze across what portion of a team’s members familiarity must be
developed to improve performance. That is, must all members of a team work together or
can proportional beneﬁt be derived from just a subset of team members building experience
with each other?
Typically, a team’s familiarity is measured by the number of prior pairwise collaborations
among its members. We develop a new measure of team familiarity, distinguishing between
prior operations developing familiarity concentrated among two team members and past
procedures building broad familiarity across three or more team members. We ﬁnd that
operations building broad familiarity reduce procedure duration by more than twice as
much as operations developing concentrated familiarity. Our results imply that the beneﬁts
of broad familiarity can be replicated by a proportional amount of concentrated familiarity,
suggesting that team familiarity can be build in pieces.
The effects of both concentrated and broad familiarity decay rapidly in the setting we
study. A prior operation performed by two and three or more team members reduces
the expected duration of the focal procedure by 2.2 and 5.3 percent, respectively, if it is
performed on the same day prior to the focal operation. By contrast, an operation performed
within 1–10 days before the focal procedure reduces its average duration by 0.1 percent if it
develops concentrated familiarity and by 0.2 percent if it develops broad familiarity. We do
not ﬁnd effects of concentrated and broad familiarity developed more than 10 days before
the focal procedure.
4Chapter 1
Physician Capacity and Operative Decisions
1.1 Introduction
Physicians have long been suspected to make treatment choices not only based on patient
needs. In his seminal contribution, Arrow (1963) points speciﬁcally to the role of ﬁnancial
incentives and available time as determinants of physician decisions. An enormous body of
literature explores the implications of ﬁnancial incentives in medical care, suggesting that
physicians are considering monetary objectives in their decisions.1 By contrast, there is very
limited evidence on the impact of available capacity on physician decisions.
Despite the absence of empirical evidence, capacity has been linked to the enormous
variation in treatment decisions witnessed across many areas of medicine. Fisher et al.
(2003) document large variations in regional Medicare spending that are unrelated to
patient outcomes, leading to an enormous debate about the validity and implications of
their ﬁndings (Chandra and Staiger 2007, Doyle 2011). If treatment decisions varied with
physician capacity, high-spending regions may be spending more because their physicians
have more capacity. Physician capacity may thus be an important piece to solving this
puzzle, especially in the context of “ﬂat-of-the-curve” medicine practiced even when the
marginal returns to treatment are fairly small (Enthoven 1980, Fuchs 2004).
1See for instance Cutler (1995), Dafny (2005), and Clemens and Gottlieb (2014).
5Analyzing the impact of physician time on treatment choices is complicated by multiple
issues. First and foremost, data capturing physician capacity is rare, leading researchers to
rely on state-level variation in capacity relative to patient demand.2 Second, disentangling
time from other determinants of physician decisions constitutes a formidable challenge,
because several important determinants — such as patient characteristics and physician
skills — are not perfectly observable. Consequently, variation in physician capacity needs to
be plausibly exogenous to any unobservable determinants of physician decisions to allow
for convincing identiﬁcation.
In this chapter, I study whether physician capacity affects the operative decisions made
by orthopedic surgeons. My analysis takes advantage of short-term ﬂuctuations in physician
time stemming from institutional constraints in orthopedic surgery. In this area of medicine,
physicians have to schedule operation room time way in advance. By contrast, individual
operations are scheduled weeks or even days before the operation. This modus operandi is
feasible because many orthopedic procedures are elective — and thus not time sensitive
— and leads to occasional excess demand relative to the supply of surgery slots, resulting
primarily from two sources. First, scheduled operation room capacity varies depending on
the physician’s presence in the hospital and typically decreases before a vacation, conference,
or other external obligation. Second, the extent to which scheduled operation room capacity
is already booked up varies with the number and severity of previously seen patients.
Operative decisions constitute the primary outcome measure of this study. Besides their
obvious relevance to patients, operative decisions are an advantageous outcome because
the need for surgery is rarely perfectly clear. Many orthopedic conditions can be addressed
using either surgical or non-operative treatments, resulting in enormous physician discretion
in whether or not to operate. As comparable outcomes for patient treated surgically and
non-operatively are not collected in my setting, I am unable to analyze the relationship
between operative decisions and health outcomes. I consider treatment costs as secondary
outcome measure.
2For instance, Gruber and Owings (1996) exploit variation in fertility rates across states.
6Of course, operative decisions vary with patient and physician characteristics that
are unobservable. I rely on two strategies to address these identiﬁcation issues. First, I
concentrate on patients seeing an orthopedic surgeon for the ﬁrst time during an ofﬁce
encounter scheduled in advance with the physician’s secretary. I argue that unobservable
patient characteristics are unlikely to be endogenous to physician capacity in this setting.
Second, I focus on analyzing operative decisions of the same physician, taking advantage
of short-term ﬂuctuations in physician capacity. To the extent that unobservable physician
characteristics do not ﬂuctuate within short-term periods, this strategy ensures that results
are not driven by differences in physician expertise.
I ﬁnd that short-term physician capacity at the time of the initial encounter between
a patient and an orthopedic surgeon signiﬁcantly increases subsequent operation rates.
Relative to the mean operation rate of 8.6, 16.9, and 22.7 percent within 30, 90, and 360 days,
respectively, a one standard deviation increase in physician capacity raises the operation
rate by 3.7 percent within a month, 3.2 percent within a quarter, and 1.7 percent within
a year. To explore whether these effects are nonlinear, I assign patients to quintiles based
on the physician’s capacity during their encounter. Within 90 days, operations rates are
7.1 percent higher in the top quintile relative to the bottom quintile. Furthermore, I
demonstrate that the impact of physician capacity on operation rates varies systematically
with medical discretion. Capacity has almost no impact on the treatment of patients
suffering from diagnoses allowing for limited physician discretion such as carpal tunnel
syndrome. By contrast, conditions that can be treated both surgically and non-operatively
— for example hand osteoarthritis — feature operation rates ﬂuctuating substantially with
available capacity.
In general, treatment choices are determined by demand, supply, and situational factors
(Chandra et al. 2011). As physician time is related to supply and situational factors, this
chapter borrows from both strands of the literature. A large body of research examines
whether physicians induce demand by changing patients’ desired treatments (McClellan
2011). Initial studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the intensity of service
7provision and the number of physicians relative to the population (Fuchs 1978, Cromwell
and Mitchell 1986), but suffer from identiﬁcation issues (Dranove and Wehner 1994). Gruber
and Owings (1996) address these challenges by taking advantage of an exogenous demand
shocks to disentangle supply and demand factors. I use a similar strategy while exploiting
changes in supply and relying on much more precisely identiﬁed short-term variation rather
than state-level changes in the occurrence of medical conditions.
I follow the situational literature — such as Choudhry et al. (2006) — in exploiting
physician-level rather than regional variation in operation rates. This strategy ensures
that my analysis is not biased by physician characteristics, addressing one of the most
pressing concerns raised in the analysis of the regional variation in operation rates (Glover
1938, Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973, Fisher et al. 2003). These studies claim that patient
and physician characteristics are balanced across regions, an assumption that has been
questioned in recent work (Chandra and Staiger 2007, Doyle 2011). My study addresses
both of these issues based on physician-level variation. Besides controlling for physician
characteristics, using physician-level variation ensures that physician capacity is exogenous
to patient characteristics.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 further explains the variation in physician
capacity I observe based on the example of a typical schedule of an orthopedic surgeon.
Section 1.3 describes the setting and data, emphasizing the identiﬁcation and utilization
of variation in physician time that is plausibly exogenous to patient characteristics. In
Section 1.4, I outline the empirical strategy and discuss the estimation framework underlying
this chapter. Section 1.5 presents the corresponding results. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Capacity Constraints in Orthopedic Surgery
In the setting studied in this chapter, orthopedic surgeons have to schedule operation
room time far in advance. Typically, physicians do not know which patients they are
going to operate when they request operation room time. Thus, they have to estimate
patient demand based on their experience. According to anecdotal evidence, they also
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the hypothetical schedule of an orthopedic surgeon observed when the
surgeon schedules operation room time far in advance of the observation period.
Figure 1.1: Typical Schedule of Orthopedic Surgeon
consider obligations that are scheduled long in advance, including meetings, conferences,
and vacations. Orthopedic surgeons are able to handle their operation schedule this way
because many orthopedic surgeries are elective and do not need to be performed urgently.
Figure 1.1 illustrates a hypothetical schedule of an orthopedic surgeon over a three-week
period at the time of requesting operation room time. Here, we see the physician request
two operation days per week during the ﬁrst and third week. During the second week,
the surgeon plans to attend a conference, and thus plans just one operation day. While
the surgeon does not know how many surgeries he will actually perform during each
operation day — this number depends very much on the type of procedure as well as
patient characteristics — he expects to perform about four procedures per day. Figure 1.1
also shows that the physician is seeing new patients in his ofﬁce during each Monday of the
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the hypothetical schedule of an orthopedic surgeon observed on the ﬁrst
Monday of the observation period.
Figure 1.2: Typical Schedule of Orthopedic Surgeon — First Monday
observation period. These patients’ subsequent operative decisions are the central outcome
variable analyzed in this paper.
In Figure 1.2, we observe the physician’s schedule at the start of the ﬁrst Monday of
the observation period. At this point, the surgeon has already assigned some patients
surgery slots during the ﬁrst three operation days. Thus, he has ﬁve operation slots available
within a week of the seeing patients during the ﬁrst Monday. Another three surgery slots
are available within two weeks. In my setting, such a situation would reﬂect ample spare
capacity. Figure 1.3 visualizes the surgeon’s schedule at the start of the second Monday of
the observation period. Now, the physician has only one operation slot available within
a week of seeing patients during the second Monday, and four more open surgery slots
within two weeks. This situation reﬂects fairly low short-term capacity.
10N
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the hypothetical schedule of an orthopedic surgeon observed on the second
Monday of the observation period.
Figure 1.3: Typical Schedule of Orthopedic Surgeon — Second Monday
In this chapter, I analyze whether patients initially seen on the ﬁrst Monday are more
likely to be operated than patients ﬁrst seen during the second Monday. Put differently, I
estimate whether the physician’s open surgery slots within a week of the initial encounter
with a patient affect the patient’s subsequent operative decision. As shown in Figures 1.2
and 1.3, the variation in open surgery slots stems from two sources. The number of
scheduled operation days within a week of the initial meeting with a patient is twice as high
during the ﬁrst Monday compared to the second Monday. In addition, the only operation
day available within a week of the second Monday is far more booked than either of the
operations days during the ﬁrst week. It is important to note that both sources of variation
need to be considered to obtain an accurate measure of physician capacity. I discuss this
phenomenon in more detail in the next section.
111.3 Setting and Data
1.3.1 Setting
I study encounters of patients and orthopedic surgeons at a leading academic hospital.
These encounters take place at the surgeon’s ofﬁce, at the emergency department, or at
another area of the hospital. Ofﬁce encounters are scheduled with the surgeon’s staff for
patients who do not require immediate attention. In this chapter, I focus on ofﬁce encounters
constituting the ﬁrst time that a patient sees any orthopedic surgeon at the hospital. The
resulting data comprises 83,595 encounters by 20 attending orthopedic surgeons conducted
from 2003–2012.3
During an initial ofﬁce encounter, the orthopedic surgeon becomes acquainted with the
patient, determines the diagnosis, and discusses viable treatment options. The surgeon may
request X-rays and tests necessary to identify or conﬁrm the diagnosis. In some cases, the
physician performs minor procedures — such as an injection — or prescribes medications.
At the end of the encounter, the patient may be asked to schedule a follow-up encounter at
the surgeon’s ofﬁce or an operation appointment with the physician’s staff.
In this chapter, I am primarily interested in the operative decision made by the patient
and the orthopedic surgeon after their initial encounter. I track whether the patient is
operated on within 30, 90, and 360 days of the initial ofﬁce appointment. The patient
may be operated on by the physician conducting the initial ofﬁce encounter or by another
orthopedic surgeon practicing at the hospital. Figure 1.4 highlights that more than 90 percent
of operations are performed by the orthopedic surgeon who conducted the initial ofﬁce
encounter. This ratio does not change substantially over time. Thus, I focus on operations
performed by the initial orthopedic surgeon for the remainder of this chapter. Results are
robust to including operations performed by all orthopedic surgeons working at at the
hospital.
3The data excludes orthopedic surgeons maintaining an ofﬁce outside of the hospital because I cannot track
their initial patient encounters. The data also excludes orthopedic surgeon performing fewer than 1,000 initial
patient encounters or 100 operations during the observation period.
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the percentage of operations performed by orthopedic surgeons conducting
the initial ofﬁce encounter. I also observe whether a patient is operated on by another orthopedic
surgeon practicing at the same hospital. The percentage of operations performed by the initial
orthopedic surgeon is computed individually for each day following the initial ofﬁce encounter.
Figure 1.4: Operations by Initial Orthopedic Surgeon
The setting studied in this chapter offers two distinct advantages. First, operative
decisions in orthopedic surgery are both numerous and more discretionary than in other
ﬁelds in medicine. Orthopedic surgeries account for more than 30 percent of all operations
conducted at the hospital analyzed here. This percentage — which is the highest among all
of the hospital’s departments — is fairly typical for a large academic institution. Meanwhile,
scientiﬁc evidence on the optimal management of many orthopedic conditions is rare, and
the beneﬁts of surgical treatment versus non-operative management are idiosyncratic to
patients. Consequently, physicians exert substantial discretion over their operative decisions
and patients may often be given a choice between surgery and conservative treatment.
13Second, a large percentage of orthopedic conditions do not require immediate treatment,
affecting the scheduling process of both appointments and operations. As most of their
patients do not require urgent attention, orthopedic surgeons typically see new patients
during an ofﬁce appointment scheduled by the surgeon’s secretary on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-
served basis. Thus, physicians have minimal knowledge about their new patients before
their initial encounter and do not prioritize based on severity. This feature facilitates my
identiﬁcation strategy discussed in Section 1.4. Operations are similarly added to a surgeon’s
schedule based on the available capacity. This strategy is feasible because operative delays
are frequently acceptable. The next subsection discusses the operation scheduling process
and the resulting variation of physician capacity in much more detail.
1.3.2 Exogenous Variation of Physician Capacity
At the hospital considered in this study, orthopedic surgeons have to schedule operation
days — but not individual operations — months in advance. Physicians scheduling an
operation day are guaranteed to have access to a dedicated operation room and the staff
necessary to perform an operation. This staff typically includes residents, anesthesiologists,
scrub nurses, and circulating nurses. Patients not requiring emergency surgery — including
all the patients considered in this chapter — are typically operated during an operation
day. Meanwhile, emergency cases are frequently treated in dedicated emergency operating
rooms.
Individual operations are scheduled within a shorter time frame. Physicians typically
book operations within weeks or even days. Figure 1.5 is based on the number of operations
performed during an operation day and shows the percentage of these operations that have
already been booked at a given day before the operation day. It includes the operation days
of all relevant orthopedic surgeons during the observation period. On average, more than
80 percent of capacity is still available four weeks before the operation day. This percentage
reduces to about 55 percent within two weeks before the operation day. Even within a week
before the operation day, more than 20 percent of capacity is still available.
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the percentage of operations that have already been booked within a given
number of days before the operation day. The data is averaged across the operation days of all
orthopedic surgeons.
Figure 1.5: Booked Capacity
This study relies on data capturing the time when an operation was scheduled, per-
formed, or cancelled. This information is available for any surgery involving one of the
relevant surgeons during the entire observation period. Based on this data it is straightfor-
ward to track operations that have been scheduled but not yet executed. By contrast, I have
to impute scheduled operation days, implying that I observe an operation day as soon as at
least one operation has been scheduled during that day. To mediate this issue, I focus on
the expected operation schedule within seven days of an initial ofﬁce encounter. Within this
time frame, orthopedic surgeons rarely keep an operation day entirely open and are keenly
aware of their available capacity. Results are robust to using the operation schedule within
14 days of an initial ofﬁce appointment.
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the distribution of the number of scheduled operation days within seven
days of an initial ofﬁce encounter.
Figure 1.6: Scheduled Operation Days
Figure 1.6 plots the distribution of scheduled operation days within seven days of the
initial ofﬁce encounters studied in this chapter. On average, the relevant physicians schedule
1.87 operation days within seven days of an initial ofﬁce encounter considered in this chapter.
The number of scheduled operation days varies substantially, ranging from from zero to ﬁve
in about ten and one percent of relevant encounters, respectively. Presumably, this variation
stems from physicians’ vacations, conference attendances, and other external obligations
scheduled well in advance.
The distribution of scheduled operations within seven days of a relevant encounter is
shown in Figure 1.7. The average number of scheduled operations within seven days of a
relevant encounters is 6.58. The median duration of an operation that is actually performed
is 58 minutes. Physicians have already scheduled 14 or more operations within the next
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the distribution of the number of scheduled operations within seven days of
an initial ofﬁce encounter.
Figure 1.7: Scheduled Operations
week during ten percent of relevant encounters. Meanwhile, another ten percent of relevant
encounters are not linked to any upcoming operation during the next week. Obviously,
the number of scheduled operation days has a major impact on the number of scheduled
operations. The correlation of these two values amounts to 0.64. In addition, the number of
scheduled operations varies with the number and severity of recently seen patients. The
correlation between the number of scheduled operations and the number of new patients
seen by same physician within the last 28 days is 0.14.4
4The number of new patients seen by the same physician within the past 28 days is constructed based on
the sample of 83,595 encounters analyzed in this chapter.
171.3.3 Measuring Physician Capacity
Ideally, a measure of physician capacity should capture the number of open surgery slots
across the relevant operation days. Unfortunately, the number of surgery slots during a
given operation day is only observed retrospectively. To address this issue, I combine the
number of scheduled operations and scheduled operation days to estimate the number
of open surgery slots. I impute physician capacity — the total number of surgery slots —
based on the average number of operations conducted during an operation day.
The average capacity per operation day is computed individually for each physician
across the entire observation period. Formally this can be described as follows:
Average Capacityp =
Operationsp
Operation Daysp
(1.1)
Based on this measure, I determine the total capacity of physician p within time period t of
a relevant encounter. This requires multiplying the average capacity of physician p with
the number of scheduled operation days during time period t. Subsequently, I subtract
the number of operations that physician p already scheduled during time period t. The
resulting number captures how many operations can still be booked by physician p within
time period t, assuming the orthopedic surgeons operates at average capacity. This yields:
Cpt = Average Capacityp ⇤ Scheduled Operation Dayspt   Scheduled Operationspt (1.2)
Here, C denotes the available capacity of physician p during time period t, the crucial
explanatory variable of this chapter. As noted previously, t is set to seven days to mediate
concerns about operation days that have been scheduled but cannot be observed in the
data used for this study. Meanwhile, C is deﬁned at the beginning of the day of the focal
initial ofﬁce appointment. This deﬁnition addresses the potential endogeneity of physician
capacity, ensuring that C is not affected by the operative decision made by the focal patient.
To check whether C reﬂects the physician capacity that is actually realized — and can be
observed retrospectively — I analyze how well capacity predicts the number of operations
added to a physician’s schedule within seven days after a relevant encounter. Figure 1.8
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the relationship between physician capacity at the time of an initial ofﬁce
encounter and the number of operations added to the surgeon’s schedule within seven days after the
corresponding encounter. The ﬁgure adjusts for physician-month ﬁxed effects.
Figure 1.8: Physician Capacity and Added Operations
plots the relationship of C and added operations across 20 bins, adjusting for physician-
month ﬁxed effects.5 The relationship is almost perfectly linear, suggesting that C predicts
actual physician capacity with considerable precision. At the same time Figure 1.8 shows
that the C does not exactly reﬂect available capacity. Within seven days, C is frequently
negative, suggesting that orthopedic surgeons are more than fully booked based on their
average capacity. Nevertheless, these physicians seem to still add some operations to their
schedule. On the other hand, many orthopedic surgeons seem to add far fewer operations
to their schedule than C would permit. An additional unit of C does not translate to
5These estimates are based on a OLS regression of added operations on ﬁxed effects for the each of the 20
quantiles of physician capacity and each physician-month.
19analogous increase in the number of operations actually added to the physician’s schedule.
The obvious explanation is that my measure of physician capacity does not account for
a surgery’s expected duration, but averages across all of a surgeon’s operations without
taking into account the type of surgery.
1.3.4 Data
I study 83,595 initial ofﬁce encounters conducted by 20 orthopedic surgeons from 2003–2012.
The data captures any ofﬁce encounter between a relevant orthopedic surgeon and a patient
that has not previously been seen by the same or another orthopedic surgeon at the same
hospital. For each encounter, I observe the time when the encounter took place. I also have
access to the patient’s age, gender, and race. Diagnoses made during the encounter are
captured by ICD-9 codes. In addition, the data tracks whether the patient was insured by a
fee for service provider (FFS), a managed care organization (MCO), Medicare, or Medicaid.
To measure the patient’s socioeconomic status, I use the patient’s ZIP code to supplement
the data with ZIP code characteristics. I include the percentage of the ZIP code population
which is white, lives in a rural area, is aged 65 and older, or is aged 25 and older and
has at least a high school degree. I also include the median household income at the ZIP
code level. For each ZIP code characteristic, missing values are replaced with the sample
mean and indicated in a separate variable. I obtain these measures from the 2012 American
Community Survey and the 2010 Census provided by the US Census Bureau.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics across quintiles of physician capacity computed
individually for each physician. Physician capacity ﬂuctuates substantially, and operation
rates steadily increase with available capacity. Across all time periods, the operation rate
in the top quintile of physician capacity is 1.5 percentage points higher than the operation
rate in the bottom quintile. This effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
The increase of the operation rate is especially pronounced between the fourth and ﬁfth
quintile, suggesting that the raw relationship between physician capacity and operation
rates is nonlinear. Physician characteristics and the timing of encounters are fairly balanced.
20Table 1.1: Summary Statistics by Physician Capacity Quintile
Physician Capacity Quintile
12345
Physician Capacity
7 Days -3.004 -1.078* -0.016* 1.026* 2.862*
Operation Rates
30 Days 0.081 0.082 0.085 0.087 0.096*
90 Days 0.164 0.166 0.167 0.171 0.179*
360 Days 0.221 0.223 0.227 0.228 0.236*
Patient Characteristics
Age 38.64 38.66 38.51 38.52 38.62
Percent Male 0.510 0.507 0.515 0.519 0.512
Percent White 0.842 0.846 0.839 0.841 0.837
Insurance Types
Percent FFS 0.161 0.166 0.168 0.167 0.168
Percent MCO 0.634 0.633 0.633 0.634 0.630
Percent Medicaid 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.031
Percent Medicare 0.162 0.158 0.156 0.156 0.160
Percent Uninsured 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.011
ZIP Code
Median Household Income 79659 79657 79530 79504 79759
Percent Age   65 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141
Percent Highschool 0.905 0.905 0.904 0.905 0.905
Percent White 0.818 0.818 0.817 0.818 0.819
Percent Rural 0.080 0.077 0.079 0.078 0.078
Timing
Day Of Week 2.717 2.750 2.747 2.757 2.728
Day Of Month 15.58 15.72 15.35 15.65 15.58
Hour Of Day 10.93 10.90 10.88 10.86 10.92
Observations 16719 16719 16719 16719 16719
Notes: ZIP code information is reported for observations without missing ZIP
code information. * denotes signiﬁcant difference from the bottom quintile at the
ﬁve percent level, computed using standard errors clustered at the physician level.
211.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Identiﬁcation
I explore whether physician capacity affects operative decisions. If an operative decision is
made in the patient’s best interest, physician capacity should not systematically vary with
operation rates unless it is correlated with unobservable patient and physician characteristics.
I rely on two strategies to ensure that this identifying assumption is met. First, I focus
on the initial encounter between a patient and a physician. In this setting, the physician
has very limited unobservable information about the patient. Meanwhile, the patient does
not observe the physician’s schedule. Consequently, I argue that patient characteristics are
unlikely to systematically ﬂuctuate with available physician capacity. Second, I rely on
variation of the operative decisions made by the same physician within short periods of
time. Physician expertise should not vary within these time periods.
Both physicians and patients might consider unobservable patient characteristics when
scheduling an ofﬁce appointment, thus introducing a relationship between unobservable
patient characteristics and physician capacity. I address this issue by focusing on the
initial ofﬁce appointment of a patient that has never been seen by any orthopedic surgeon
practicing at the same hospital. By deﬁnition, the physician has never seen the patient when
scheduling the appointment. In fact, the initial ofﬁce appointment is typically scheduled
with the physician’s secretary, implying that physician is not even aware of the patient at the
time when the appointment is scheduled. As the patients considered in this chapter schedule
an ofﬁce appointment rather than reporting to the emergency room, they do not require
immediate attention, suggesting that the physician would not prioritize their appointment
based on patient characteristics. All in all, it appears fairly unlikely that physicians plan
their ofﬁce appointment schedule based on patient characteristics.
When scheduling an ofﬁce appointment, patients decide between several time slots
offered by the physician’s secretary. I hypothesize that unobservable patient characteristics
inﬂuence timing preferences. For instance, a patient who is working presumably prefers
22an appointment in the afternoon or on Friday. To address this bias, I include ﬁxed effects
for the hour of the day, the day of the week, and the day of the month of the time when
the appointment is performed. Another source of bias is the urgency patients exhibit in
obtaining an appointment. If the patient wishes to be seen as soon as possible, he is likely
to accept the earliest appointment available. It is unclear whether the physician has less
capacity available during these appointment. If this was the case, and if patients exhibiting
more urgency were more likely to require surgery, this would bias the relationship between
physician capacity and operation rates downwards. Thus, a positive relationship between
physician capacity and operation rates could not be rationalized by differences in patients’
urgency to obtain an appointment.
Perfectly adjusting for physician expertise is an insurmountable challenge. Several
approaches have been developed to circumvent this issue. A large literature compares
operation rates across regions rather than across physicians (Glover 1938, Wennberg and
Gittelsohn 1973, Fisher et al. 2003), implicitly assuming that physician characteristics balance
out across areas. However, recent research casts doubt on the validity of this approach
(Chandra and Staiger 2007). In the absence of exogenous variation of patient characteristics
— such as in Doyle et al. (2010) — there are no reliable methods to disentangle the impact of
patient and physician characteristics, respectively, on differences in treatment decisions and
health outcomes.
I address this issue by estimating the relationship between physician capacity and
operation rates based on variation of operative decisions made by the same physician
during the same month using physician-month ﬁxed effects. Given that all of the orthopedic
surgeons considered in this chapter have multiple years of experience, another month of
experience should not have a signiﬁcant impact on physician expertise. This approach
follows a small but growing literature exploiting variation of treatment choices within rather
than across physicians. For instance, Choudhry et al. (2006) explore whether adverse events
affect the same physician’s subsequent medication behavior.
231.4.2 Estimation
The estimating equation underlying my analyses can be formalized as follows:
Oij = a + bCj(i) + gXi + dZz(i) + hPj(i) + qTt(i) + ei (1.3)
O indicates whether patient i is operated by physician j within a given time period after
their initial ofﬁce appointment. In my analysis, I compute whether the patient was operated
within 30, 90, and 360 days of the initial ofﬁce appointment, respectively. C reﬂects the
capacity physician j has available to operate patient i within one week after ﬁrst seeing
patient i.
I control for a wide range of covariates. X accounts for patient characteristics comprising
indicators for ﬁve-year age groups, gender, race, ICD-9 diagnoses codes, and insurance
types. Z denotes a vector of the characteristics of ZIP code z patient i is living in. P controls
for physician-month ﬁxed effects, and T includes indicators for the day of the week, day of
the month, and hour of the day of time t when the initial ofﬁce appointment is performed.
I estimate Equation 1.3 using a linear probability model to simplify the interpretation of
coefﬁcients. The results are robust to using a probit model. Standard errors are clustered at
the physician-month level.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Physician Capacity
Table 1.2 presents estimates of the impact of physician capacity on operation rates within
30, 90, and 360 days of a patient’s initial ofﬁce appointment. I ﬁnd that physician capacity
has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on operation rates. My ﬁnding suggests
that each unit of physician capacity — reﬂecting an additional open surgery slot within
seven days of the initial encounter — increases a patient’s probability of being operated on
between 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points. These result are largely unaffected by controlling for
a large set of patient and encounter characteristics.
24Table 1.2: Physician Capacity and Operative Decisions
Operation
30 Days 90 Days 360 Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physician Capacity 0.163*** 0.126** 0.238*** 0.215*** 0.171** 0.153**
(0.057) (0.052) (0.069) (0.065) (0.076) (0.069)
Physician Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patient Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
ICD-9 Codes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Insurance Types No Yes No Yes No Yes
ZIP Code No Yes No Yes No Yes
Timing No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 83595 83595 83595 83595 83595 83595
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.161 0.057 0.168 0.079 0.187
Mean Operation Rate 8.596 8.596 16.928 16.928 22.701 22.701
Notes: This table reports the effect of physician capacity on whether a patient was operated
within 30, 90, or 360 days of an initial ofﬁce encounter. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100
and can be interpreted as percentages. Models are estimated by OLS and standard errors
are clustered at the physician-month level. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at
the one, ﬁve, and ten percent level, respectively.
Increasing physician capacity by one standard deviation — or 2.5 units of physician
capacity — is associated with an operation rate that is between 0.3 and 0.6 percentage points
higher according to the estimates reported in Table 1.2. Relative to the mean operation
rate, a patient’s likelihood of being operated on increases by 3.7 percent within a month,
3.2 percent within a quarter, and 1.7 percent within a year. Given that I consider the entire
patient population seen by orthopedic surgeons, these increases are substantial.
To test whether the relationship between physician capacity and operation rates is
nonlinear, I use indicators for the quintile of physician capacity rather than the level of
physician capacity to compute (1.3). The resulting estimates are plotted in Figure 1.9.
Operation rates are normalized so that the operation rate of the bottom quintile of physician
capacity is zero. Brackets mark 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. Relative to the lowest quintile
of physician capacity, operation rates steadily increase with available physician capacity.
Compared to the lowest quintile, operations rates in the top quintile are 1.2 percentage
25-
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the operation rate within 90 days of an initial ofﬁce encounter relative
to the bottom quintile of physician capacity. Coefﬁcients are plotted as circles. Vertical brackets
show 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. The underlying model is estimated by OLS and controls for
physician-month, patient characteristics, ICD-9 codes, insurance types, ZIP code, and timing ﬁxed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the physician-month level.
Figure 1.9: Operation Rate by Physician Capacity Quintile
points higher, translating to a 7.1 percent increase over the mean 90 day operation rate.
Operations rates are signiﬁcantly different from the bottom quintile only in the top quintile.
1.5.2 Physician Discretion
Presumably, the discretion physicians exert when deciding whether to operate on a patient
varies across conditions. I hypothesize that physician capacity affects operative decisions
more when orthopedic surgeons have substantial discretion. Unfortunately, consistently
measuring physician discretion across all diagnoses is almost impossible. To address this
issue, I focus on seven of the most frequent diagnoses in my data. Across these diagnoses,
26both the medical literature and discussions with physicians enable me to assess the extent of
physician discretion. For each of these diagnoses, I estimate a simple version of Equation 1.3
adjusting for physician-ﬁxed effects. Figure 1.10 plots the resulting estimates. The constant
term — describing the operation rate when physician capacity is zero — is plotted as circle.
The coefﬁcient for capacity is multiplied by the standard deviation of physician capacity,
and the resulting range of operation rates is represented as horizontal bracket.
Figure 1.10 demonstrates that the impact of physician capacity on operation rates varies
across diagnoses and appears to ﬂuctuate systematically with physician discretion. Patients
with a carpal tunnel syndrome6, hand osteoarthrosis7, or a trigger ﬁnger8 are most frequently
seen by hand surgeons. While there are relatively clear guidelines when to operate on a
patient with a carpal tunnel syndrome, indications to operate a patient with a trigger ﬁnger
are somewhat less clear. By contrast, orthopedic hand surgeons have substantial discretion
in whether to operate a patient with hand osteoarthrosis. Figure 1.10 reﬂects these facts,
indicating that physician capacity has almost no inﬂuence on carpal tunnel operation rates,
but matters enormously for hand osteoarthrosis operation rates.
Other frequent upper extremity diagnoses include rotator cuff tears9 — the most common
shoulder condition treated by orthopedic upper extremity surgeons — and Colles fractures10
involving the arm. The medical literature suggests that there is substantial discretion
whether to operate on patients suffering from a rotator cuff tear (Williams et al. 2004).
Figure 1.10 again mirrors this fact, indicating that physician capacity impacts rotator cuff
6A carpal tunnel syndrome occurs if the median nerve — running from the axilla to the hand — becomes
pressured. This condition can be treated by surgically releasing the ligament pressuring the median nerve.
7Hand osteoarthritis refers to joint degradation in the hand, causing pain and stiffness. It is treated non-
surgically by injecting or splinting and surgically by a number of procedures such as proximal row carpectomy
and total wrist arthroplasty or arthrodesis.
8A patient has a trigger ﬁnger if the corresponding ﬁnger ﬂexor tendon is locked, snapped, or catched. To
treat the resulting pain and dysfunction non-operatively, physicians may either splint or inject the ﬁnger. The
surgical treatment option requires cutting the sheath restricting the tendon.
9Rotator cuff tears involve tearing a tendon of the rotator cuff muscles. Tears may be traumatic or chronic.
Both operative and conservative treatments — involving physiotherapy and pain management — are feasible.
10A fracture of the distal radius, the Colles fracture typically affects patients with osteoporosis. Displaced
Colles fractures are treated surgically, while non displaced Colles fractures may be managed conservatively.
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the operation rate within 90 days of an initial ofﬁce encounter across
frequent diagnoses. Circles indicate the estimated operation rate when physician capacity is zero.
Horizontal brackets indicate the impact of a one standard deviation move in physician capacity above
or below zero. The underlying models estimate the impact of capacity on operation rates across all
patient with a given diagnosis using OLS and adjust for physician-month ﬁxed effects.
Figure 1.10: Operation Rate across Frequent Diagnoses
tear operation rates. Meanwhile, the Colles fracture — which allows for less physician
discretion — is less affected by physician capacity.
Spine surgery is often seen as the most discretionary discipline within orthopedic surgery.
Not surprisingly, the operation rates for scoliosis11 and degenerated lumbar disc12 — the
most frequent spine-related diagnoses in my data — are affected very substantially by
11Scoliosis is a condition where the patient’s spine is curved abnormally, bending from side to side. Frequently,
operative treatment is not warranted. Other treatment options include physiotherapy, casting, or bracing.
Surgical options include anterior and posterior fusion.
12Degenerated lumbar discs in the spine can lead to enormous chronic pain for some patients. They may be
treated conservatively with physiotherapy, medications reducing inﬂammation, and spinal injections. Potential
operations include discectomy and fusion, laminectomy, and corpectomy.
28physician capacity. The ratio between the lowest and highest operation rate for scoliosis is
more than two, suggesting that the operation probability more than doubles following a
two standard deviation increase in physician capacity.
1.5.3 Physician Remuneration
A physician’s available capacity may not only inﬂuence the surgeon’s operative decisions,
but also impact the reimbursement physicians receive for treating a patient. While the
data used for this chapter does not comprise actual payments made to physicians, it tracks
all procedures administered by a relevant orthopedic surgeon. I use the corresponding
CPT codes to compute the relative value units (RVU) associated with all of the treatments
provided by the focal physician performing the initial appointment with a patient within
30, 90, and 360 days of the initial encounter. RVUs are used by Medicare to compute the
reimbursement physicians receive for a given procedure, but should not be interpreted in
dollar terms.13
I estimate the impact of physician capacity on RVUs analogous to Equation 1.3. Table 1.3
presents the corresponding results. Columns 1, 3, and 5 show the impact of physician
capacity on RVUs. Increasing physician capacity by one standard deviation raises RVUs by
1.7, 2.1, and 1.2 percent within 30, 90, and 360 days of the initial encounter, respectively. It is
noteworthy that the estimates across 30 and 360 days are fairly noisy.14
I am primarily concerned with the impact of operative decisions on the relationship
between physician capacity and RVUs. Columns 2, 4, and 6 demonstrate that operative
decisions entirely explain the impact of physician capacity on RVUs. The point estimates
13RVUs have to be multiplied by the geographic practice cost index varying across regions and the Medicare
conversion factor — which is constant across regions — to compute the reimbursement in dollar terms.
14A potential explanation for this ﬁnding is that not all procedures are captured by CPT codes. A considerable
percentage of operations is captured solely by ICD-9 procedure codes. Both CPT and ICD-9 procedure codes
may be used for billing purposes. As there is no generally accepted translation from ICD-9 procedure codes to
CPT codes, I refrain from using these codes. Consequently, RVUs are biased downwards, especially at the time
when an operation captured by ICD-9 procedure codes has already been conducted, but the corresponding
after-care — measured by CPT codes — has yet to be performed. This phenomenon might help to explain why
the coefﬁcient in Column 1 of Table 1.3 is so low.
29Table 1.3: Physician Capacity and Relative Value Units
Relative Value Units
30 Days 90 Days 360 Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physician Capacity 0.035 -0.005 0.089*** 0.002 0.073* -0.004
(0.022) (0.018) (0.031) (0.025) (0.041) (0.035)
Operation 30 Days 31.826***
(0.499)
Operation 90 Days 40.523***
(0.596)
Operation 360 Days 50.497***
(0.774)
Observations 83595 83595 83595 83595 83595 83595
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.422 0.176 0.469 0.208 0.479
Mean RVU 5.033 5.033 10.308 10.308 15.784 15.784
Notes: This table reports the effect of physician capacity on the RVUs within 30, 90, or 360
days of an initial ofﬁce encounter. Models are estimated by OLS and control for physician-
month, patient characteristics, ICD-9 codes, insurance types, ZIP code, and timing ﬁxed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the physician-month level. ***, **, and * denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent level, respectively.
for the impact of physician capacity are very close to zero across all time periods. Given
that physician capacity is deﬁned based on the number of operations a physician could
conduct when operating at average capacity, these ﬁndings are expected. In addition, the
result that physician capacity has no impact on all but operative decisions strengthens the
argument that there is no relationship between physician capacity and unobservable patient
characteristics, supporting my identiﬁcation strategy.
1.5.4 Robustness
I consider three types of robustness checks. I start by estimating Equation 1.3 separately for
different groups of patients and for different groups of encounters based on the time of the
day and day of the week when the focal encounter took place. In addition, I use each of the
sources of variation underlying physician capacity — scheduled operations and scheduled
operation days — to conﬁrm that they individually and jointly predict operation rates.
30Patient Characteristics Table 1.4 reports the impact of physician capacity on 90 day
operation rates across various patient characteristics. As shown in Columns 1–5, physician
capacity appears to affect operative decisions differently across age groups. While physician
capacity has no discernible effect for patients aged between 20–39 years and very old
patients, it signiﬁcantly impacts the operation rates of patients who are older than 40 years
and younger than 80 years. Anecdotal evidence supports this ﬁnding, suggesting that
operative decisions involving substantial physician discretion frequently affect patients in
that age group, especially if they are older than 60 years but still young enough to cope
with the risks posed by an operation.
Columns 6–10 present estimates across race. White patients constitute 84 percent of all
patients considered in this study. Thus, it is not surprising that the coefﬁcient in Column
10 corresponds to the overall estimates in Table 1.2. While operation rates seem to differ
substantially across race, I lack power to identify a differential impact of physician capacity
on operative decisions. Similarly, estimates across insurance type presented in Columns
11–15 suffer from insufﬁcient sample size to allow for reliable inferences. Nevertheless,
Column 13 at least suggests that patients insured by Medicaid are much more affected by
changes in physician capacity than any other group. Meanwhile, patients insured by a
MCO are impacted least by physician capacity. This ﬁnding is consistent with anecdotal
evidence pointing to a more limited role of the discretion exerted by physicians when they
are consulting and treating patients insured by a MCO.
Finally, Columns 16–20 look at the impact of the median household income of the
patient’s ZIP code of residence on the relationship between physician capacity and operation
rates. Interestingly, patients living in the lowest quintile by median ZIP household income
appear to be twice as affected by physician capacity as the overall estimates in Table 1.2
would imply. Potentially, physicians hesitate to operate on these patients unless they have
ample spare capacity because they impute their potential reimbursement from the patient’s
socioeconomic status.
31Table 1.4: Physician Capacity and Operation Rates across Patient Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Operation 90 Days
Age
0–19 20–39 40–59 60–79 80–100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Physician Capacity 0.443* 0.059 0.250** 0.435*** -0.039
(0.227) (0.123) (0.110) (0.167) (1.135)
Observations 20501 20608 27078 13606 1798
Mean Operation Rate 8.190 18.711 20.219 20.726 17.853
Race
Asian Black Hispanic Other White
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Physician Capacity 0.103 0.129 0.365 1.235 0.221***
(0.529) (0.507) (0.351) (1.839) (0.071)
Observations 3066 3340 5640 1225 70324
Mean Operation Rate 12.883 13.293 12.855 14.694 17.643
Insurance Type
FFS MCO Medicaid Medicare None
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Physician Capacity 0.290 0.118 0.823 0.212 -0.474
(0.183) (0.085) (1.001) (0.167) (1.748)
Observations 13887 52895 2518 13247 1048
Mean Operation Rate 17.858 16.225 11.398 19.687 18.511
ZIP Code Income Quintile
12 3 4 5
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Physician Capacity 0.393** 0.003 0.180 0.237 0.202
(0.155) (0.160) (0.163) (0.167) (0.153)
Observations 16334 16534 16393 16248 16811
Mean Operation Rate 16.861 18.368 17.507 16.661 15.169
Notes: Each cell reports a separate regression. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100
and can be interpreted as percentages. Models are estimated by OLS and control
for physician-month, patient characteristics, ICD-9 codes, insurance types, ZIP
code, and timing ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the physician-month
level. Observations with missing ZIP code information are dropped from the last
panel. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent
level, respectively.
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the impact of physician capacity on the operation rate within 90 days of
an initial ofﬁce encounter. Each circle represents the coefﬁcient estimate from a separate regression
including all encounters that were performed during that hour. Vertical brackets show 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals. The underlying model is estimated by OLS and controls for physician-month,
patient characteristics, ICD-9 codes, insurance types, ZIP code, and timing ﬁxed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the physician-month level.
Figure 1.11: Physician Capacity and Operation Rates across Hours
Encounter Timing In Figure 1.11, I present estimates of the impact of physician capacity
on operative decisions within 90 days of the initial encounter across the hour of the day
when the focal encounter took place. Standard errors — shown as vertical brackets — are
substantial given the limited amount of data available during each hour. I cannot reject the
hypothesis that physician capacity has the same impact on operation rates across all hours.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that physician capacity seems to matter most during the
late morning and late afternoon. As many orthopedic surgeons schedule ofﬁce encounters
for either the morning or the afternoon, this ﬁnding suggests that physicians are especially
33-
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the impact of physician capacity on the operation rate within 90 days of
an initial ofﬁce encounter. Each circle represents the coefﬁcient estimate from a separate regression
including all encounters that were performed during that weekday. Vertical brackets show 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals. The underlying model is estimated by OLS and controls for physician-month,
patient characteristics, ICD-9 codes, insurance types, ZIP code, and timing ﬁxed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the physician-month level.
Figure 1.12: Physician Capacity and Operation Rates across Weekdays
considering their capacity towards the end of a shift. Figure 1.11 might even underreport
this effect as physician capacity is measured at the start of each day. Consequently, actual
physician capacity at the end of a shift might be lower than observed physician capacity,
implying that the effect of physician capacity on operation rates would be biased downwards.
Figure 1.12 plots the impact of physician capacity on operation rates across weekdays.
Again, the statistical power is not sufﬁcient to reject the hypothesis the inﬂuence of physician
capacity does not vary across weekdays. Taken at face value, the results suggest that
orthopedic surgeons consider their capacity twice as much during Fridays. Explanations
34Table 1.5: Sources of Physician Capacity
Operation 90 Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scheduled Operation Days 0.269 0.660*** 0.232 0.599***
(0.174) (0.243) (0.167) (0.232)
Scheduled Operations -0.021 -0.131** -0.024 -0.123**
(0.045) (0.063) (0.042) (0.058)
Physician Month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Patient Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
ICD-9 Codes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Insurance Type No No No Yes Yes Yes
ZIP Code No No No Yes Yes Yes
Timing No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 83595 83595 83595 83595 83595 83595
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.168 0.168 0.168
Mean Operation Rate 16.928 16.928 16.928 16.928 16.928 16.928
Notes: This table reports the effect of scheduled operation days and operations within seven
days of an initial ofﬁce encounter on operation rates within 90 days of the focal encounter.
Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 and can be interpreted as percentages. Models are estimated
by OLS and standard errors are clustered at the physician-month level. ***, **, and * denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent level, respectively.
for this ﬁnding could range from differences in patient characteristics to ﬂuctuations in
physician behavior.
Sources of Physician Capacity As discussed in Section 1.3, physician capacity is computed
based on the number of scheduled operations and operation days within seven days of the
focal initial ofﬁce encounter. Combining these measures into a single capacity indicator
addresses the issue that operations and operation days are not very informative in isolation,
because their impact on available physician capacity very much depends on operation days
and operations, respectively. Nevertheless, I test the robustness of my ﬁndings by exploring
whether scheduled operations and scheduled operation days individually and jointly predict
operation rates.
Table 1.5 presents the corresponding estimates, reporting the impact of scheduled
operations and scheduled operation days on operation rates within 90 days of an initial
35ofﬁce appointment. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 show that scheduled operation days and
operations have the expected impact on operation rates, but are not individually signiﬁcant.
Columns 3 and 6 document that both scheduled operations and operation days are highly
signiﬁcant predictors of operation rates when they are combined in the same regression.
Not surprisingly, the impact of operation days and operations and is captured much more
precisely once accounting for both of these measures.
In theory, an additional operation day should increase physician capacity by 3.52 — the
average number of operations per operation day — as much as an additional operation
reduces it. I test this hypothesis based on the estimates obtained in Column 6 with the
following Wald test:
Scheduled Operation Days+ 3.52⇤ Scheduled Operations = 0 (1.4)
The resulting F-statistic is 0.94 with a corresponding probability of 0.33, implying that I
cannot reject the hypothesis. Thus, using the average number of operations per operation
day to construct physician capacity appears reasonable.
1.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I study the impact of available physician capacity on operations within a
month, a quarter, and a year of the initial encounter between a patient and an orthopedic
surgeon. I ﬁnd that operation rates across all time periods are signiﬁcantly higher when
the physician has ample spare capacity to schedule an operation within seven days of the
focal encounter. As my analysis accounts for physician-month ﬁxed effects, this ﬁnding is
unlikely to be related to differences in physician characteristics. Meanwhile, the peculiarities
of the setting of this chapter suggest that physician capacity is exogenous to unobservable
patient characteristics.
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that a fairly substantial number of
operative decisions in orthopedic surgery is made under consideration of the physician
capacity available within a week of the initial encounter. The impact of these operative
36decisions on health outcomes is unknown. Nevertheless, there is no scenario in which
the operative decisions documented in this chapter are optimal. If operative decisions
made under consideration of physician capacity are beneﬁcial, orthopedic surgeons should
perform surgeries on comparable patients arriving during periods when physician capacity is
more limited. If, on the other hand, health outcomes are unaffected — or even deteriorated
— by surgical decisions made under consideration of physician capacity, non-operative
management would constitute a better treatment option for the corresponding patients.
Changes to physician and patient behavior to eliminate the impact of physician capacity
on operative decisions would not only be advantageous in theory, but also feasible in
practice. The patients considered in this chapter schedule an ofﬁce appointment rather than
reporting to the emergency room, suggesting that they do not require immediate surgery. If
surgery was beneﬁcial, orthopedic surgeons could schedule these patients for surgery at a
later date or refer them to a colleague. I observe neither response in my data. Meanwhile, if
non-operative management constitutes an adequate treatment option, it is almost always
more time- and cost-efﬁcient that surgical treatment.
It is important to note that the impact of physician capacity on operative decisions does
not solely depend on orthopedic surgeons. Patients may also alter their operative decisions
conditional on the waiting time for a surgery. Perhaps, physicians with limited short-term
capacity suggest their patients to think about their preference between conservative and
surgical treatment for a couple of weeks. During this period, patients may learn to cope with
their pain, making non-operative treatment feasible in the long run. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that at least some patients behave according to this hypothesis, suggesting that —
contrary to intuition — constrained physician capacity can be beneﬁcial in some situations.
This chapter supplements an enormous body of research reporting abundant variation
of operative decisions across regions. To the extent that physician capacity ﬂuctuates across
regions, the variation in operative decisions documented in this chapter could help to
explain regional variation in operation rates. Unfortunately, reliable data on short-term
physician capacity across regions is not readily available. Besides painting another picture
37of variation of surgical decisions, this chapter adds to the literature by addressing two of its
concerns. First, it exploits variation of the same orthopedic surgeon over time, convincingly
controlling for differences in physician characteristics. Second, it considers every patients
seen by a physician within the context of an initial ofﬁce encounter. By contrast, previous
research typically considers patients with a speciﬁc diagnosis, making sample selection
susceptible to diagnosis behavior (Song et al. 2010, Welch et al. 2011).
Variation in elective operative decisions is frequently related to the “gray area” of
medicine (Chandra et al. 2011), where physicians exert substantial discretion because the
beneﬁts of surgical treatment are unclear. Additional evidence on the effectiveness of
surgical and non-operative treatments in this area of medicine would be enormously helpful.
The relationship between physician capacity and operation rates documented in this chapter
could support this effort, because it suggests that physician capacity introduces exogenous
variation into operative decisions. What is currently missing, however, is data that is
tracking health outcomes across patients undergoing surgery and patients who are treated
non-operatively. Putting these pieces together is a promising avenue for future research.
38Chapter 2
Operative Delays and Hip Fracture Outcomes:
Operation Room Availability as Instrumental
Variable1
2.1 Introduction
Annually, about 1.0 percent of women and 0.4 percent of men aged 65 and older suffer
from a hip fracture in the United States (Brauer et al. 2009). Understanding the relationship
between operative delays and outcomes experienced by these patients is crucial to determine
the importance of treating these patients as soon as possible after their admission.
The evidence on the impact of operative delays on patient outcomes continues to be
inconclusive. Holmberg et al. (1987) do not ﬁnd adverse effects of operative delays up to
one week after admission. By contrast, more recent evidence suggests that operative delays
are correlated with worse patient outcomes.2 In a systematic review, Khan et al. (2009)
conclude that surgery within 48 hours of admission reduces length of stay and may reduce
complications and mortality.
1Co-authored with David Ring and Mark S. Vrahas.
2See for instance Fox et al. (1994), Rogers et al. (1995), Weller et al. (2005), Moran et al. (2005), and Bottle
and Aylin (2006).
39Estimating the relationship between operative delays and the outcomes of patients
after hip fractures is complicated by differences in patient characteristics. Typically, severe
cases require more time to be prepared for surgery while also featuring worse health
outcomes. Unless patient characteristics simultaneously inﬂuencing operative delay and
patient outcomes are observed perfectly — which we believe to be impossible — estimates
of the impact of operative delays on patient outcomes are biased.
We address this issue by exploiting quasi-random variation in the availability of operation
rooms at the time of patient arrival. While the operation room capacity available to trauma
surgeons — who treat the vast majority of hip fractures in our setting — has a small but
statistically signiﬁcant impact on operative delay, it presumably does not correlate with
patient characteristics and outcomes. Thus, instrumenting operative delay with operation
room availability allows for causal inference.
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Data
We analyze data provided by the Research Patient Data Registry at Massachusetts General
Hospital, an academic center located in Boston, Massachusetts. We consider patients seeing
an orthopedic surgeon at the hospital between 2003–2012. Patients are included if they are
older than 59 and have been diagnosed with a hip fracture based on the following ICD-9
codes: 820.00, 820.01, 820.02, 820.03, 820.09, 820.10, 820.11, 820.12, 820.13, 820.19, 820.20,
820.21, 820.22, 820.30, 820.31, 820.32, 820.8, 820.9. We consider only a patient’s initial hip
fracture diagnosis and focus on patients who ﬁrst reported to the emergency room and were
subsequently operated at the same hospital.3
Operative delay is deﬁned as the time between the patient’s arrival in the emergency
room and the start of the operative procedure. We use operative delay as a continuous
measure captured in hours. We also consider binary indicators of operative delay depending
3We exclude patients without an applicable emergency discharge note or operation record.
40on whether a patient was operated with 24 or 48 hours of admission to the hospital. Patients
waiting more than 240 hours for their operation — one percent of the sample — are excluded.
Subsequently, our sample contains 1,977 patients.
We consider ﬁve outcome measures. Death is deﬁned within 30 days of the operation
date. Readmission is deﬁned within 30 days of the discharge date if it resulted in another
inpatient stay. Reoperation is deﬁned within 90 days of the discharge date. This indicator
variable is based on the following CPT codes: 10140, 10160, 10180, 11000, 11001, 11043,
11044, 11047, 26990, 26991, 26992, 76942, 77012, 77021, 97597. Infection accounts for both
surgical site infections and more general infections such as pneumonia, sepsis, and urinary
tract infections within 90 days of the discharge date. Finally, transfusion indicates whether
the patient received a transfusion within 24 hours after the end of the surgical procedure.
We adjust for a broad range of patient characteristics. Besides gender and ﬁve-year
age-groups4 covariates include the type of hip fracture diagnosis speciﬁed as ﬁxed effects.5
We use two types of indicators to capture a patient’s overall health condition. First, we use
each of the categories of diagnoses used in the Charlson comorbidity index (Charlson et al.
1987, Quan et al. 2011) as ﬁxed effects.6 In addition, we create a variable indicating whether
the patient reported to the hospital within 30 days before the admission date.
Finally, we account for the time of patient arrival at the emergency department. We
control for ﬁxed effects for the hour of the day, day of the week, and year. The ﬁrst two
covariates are meant to capture variation in resource availability during the day and the
week. They also account for potential variations of patient characteristics across hours or
weekdays. By contrast, year ﬁxed effects adjust for long-term time trends in the treatment
of hip fractures.
4Patients aged 95 and older are grouped in the ﬁnal age group.
5ICD-9 codes 820.00, 820.09, 820.20, 820.21, 820.22, and 820.8 are grouped individually. The remaining ICD-9
codes account for less than three percent of the patients in our sample and are grouped together as residual
category.
6The following categories are included in the Charlson comorbidity index: Chronic pulmonary disease,
rheumatologic disease, chronic diabetes, renal disease, congestive heartfailure, dementia, mild liver disease,
hemiplegia, paraplegia, malignancy, moderate and severe liver disease, AIDS, and tumor.
412.2.2 Operation Room Availability
Operation room availability is measured using records tracking when an operation is
scheduled, performed, or cancelled by any of the attending trauma surgeons practicing at
the hospital. In our setting, these surgeons conduct the majority of hip fracture operations.7
We approximate the trauma surgeons’ access to operation room time by considering the
operation room time that has already been requested at the time of a patient’s arrival and
the number of operations previously scheduled during that time.
We do not observe the operation room time that has been requested by the trauma
surgeons before a patient’s arrival. To address this issue, we estimate the requested operation
room time by counting the number of days during which a trauma surgeon had scheduled
at least one operation prior to a patient’s arrival in the emergency room. Subsequently, we
compute the surgeon’s long-term average capacity by dividing his number of operations
by the number of operation days over the entire sample period.8 We multiply the resulting
average number of operations per operation day by the number of operation days scheduled
by that surgeon, resulting in the total operation room capacity of that surgeon. We proceed
analogously for each trauma surgeon and sum the operation room capacity across all of the
attending trauma surgeons.
To obtain the available operation room capacity, we subtract the number of operations
scheduled before a patient’s arrival — reﬂecting the unavailable capacity — from the total
operation room capacity computed above. Thus, our measure captures how easily surgeons
can obtain additional operation room time at the time of patient arrival, although it is by no
means perfect. We consider operations to be performed within four days after a patient’s
arrival. This time interval covers the operative delays of almost 95 percent of the selected
patients.
7Besides trauma surgeons, patients with hip fractures are sometimes operated on by fellows and by attending
orthopedic surgeons specializing in elective hip replacement rather than trauma surgery.
8For this computation we consider all of the operations performed by the corresponding trauma surgeon.
422.2.3 Estimation
We strive to estimate the impact of operative delays on patient outcomes based on the
following regression model:
Oi = a + bDi + gXi + dPj(i) + qTt(i) + ei (2.1)
Here, O denotes the outcome of patient i. D denotes the operative delay faced by patient
i. X comprises a vector adjusting for patient characteristics described in more detail in
Section 2.2.1. Meanwhile, P includes ﬁxed effects for physician j operating on patient
i.9 T controls for the hour of the day, day of the week, and year, all speciﬁed as ﬁxed
effects. Finally, e denotes the patient-speciﬁc error term. We estimate ordinary least square
models despite the binary character of outcomes, because subsequent instrumental variable
estimation is much more robust within this framework compared to a logistic or probit
regression model.
The identifying assumption underlying (2.1) is that the covariates are uncorrelated
with unobserved determinants of patient outcomes, which are captured by the error term
e. An enormous body of research — summarized by Shiga et al. (2008) — points to the
possibility that unobserved patient characteristics may impact both operative delays and
patient outcomes. If this was the case, coefﬁcients obtained after estimating (2.1) would be
biased.
Extensively controlling for patient characteristics clearly reduces the bias arising from
differences in patient characteristics.10 Nonetheless, it appears close to impossible to
adjust for patient characteristics to an extent that unobservable patient characteristics can
be reasonably expected to be uncorrelated with patient outcomes. Rather than seeking
to increase the preciseness of patient covariates we suggest ensuring the validity of the
identifying assumption underlying (2.1) by using an instrumental variable.
9Surgeons performing fewer than 50 surgeries in our sample are assigned to a residual category.
10For instance, Bottle and Aylin (2006) analyze the impact of at least one day of operative delay on death in
hospital for patients suffering from a hip fracture. They ﬁnd that controlling for patient characteristics reduces
the odds ratio of operative delay 1.39 to 1.27.
432.2.4 Instrumental Variables
Instrumental variables were ﬁrst introduced by Wright (1928) and have become widely used
by economists and statisticians. Applications in the medical literature include McClellan
et al. (1994). This concept addresses issues arising from the correlation between covariates
and the error term in a regression model. To be valid, an instrumental variable needs
to be both correlated with the covariate of interest and uncorrelated with the error term
conditional on the other covariates. Consequently, an instrumental variable ﬁxing (2.1)
needs to predict operative delay without otherwise being related to the patient’s outcome.
We consider operation room availability as such an instrumental variable, hypothesizing
that operation room availability has an inﬂuence on operative delay without being otherwise
correlated with patient characteristics.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Study Population
Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of operative delay across the study population. About a
third of patients are treated within 24 hours after being admitted to the emergency room.
72 percent of patients are treated within 48 hours. Figure 2.2 plots average patient outcomes
across categories of operative delay. A positive correlation between operative delay and
adverse patient outcomes is evident. For instance, mortality amounts to 3.1 percent for
patients being operated within 24 hours of admission. By contrast, patients who wait more
than 96 hours for their operation die within 30 days in 10.8 percent of cases. We strive to
explain to which extent this correlation is causal.
Table 2.1 summarizes the data used in this study by grouping patients according to the
operation room availability available at the time of their arrival in the emergency room.
We consider quintiles of operation room availability. Operation room availability ranges
from -2.8 to 4.0, implying that the number of available surgery slots within four days
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the distribution of operative delays across the sample of patients analyzed in
this study.
Figure 2.1: Operative Delays
of patient arrival varies substantially.11 Operative delay steadily declines with operation
room availability. Compared to the bottom quintile of operation room availability, the top
quintile features operative delays that are almost ﬁve hours shorter on average. This effect
is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
Interestingly, the bottom quintiles of operation room availability features not only the
longest operative delays, but also the worst average patient outcomes. The mortality rate
in the bottom quintile is roughly two percentage points higher than in any other quintile.
Similarly, the values for readmission, reoperation, and infection are highest in one of the
bottom quintiles. These effects are not statistically signiﬁcant, however.
11Operation room availability is negative if physicians have already scheduled more operations than their
average capacity multiplied by the number of operation days.
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Figure 2.2: Operative Delays and Patient Outcomes
Patients are indistinguishable across quintiles of operation room availability, conﬁrming
our identiﬁcation strategy. By contrast, operation room availability varies signiﬁcantly with
the hour and day of patient arrival. Patients arriving later during the day are exposed to
less operation room availability. Given our deﬁnition of operation room availability this
makes perfect sense. As the day progresses, trauma surgeons schedule more operations.
At ﬁrst sight it may appear somewhat surprising that patients arriving earlier in the
week are exposed to less operation room availability. It should be noted, however, that
patients arriving during the weekend beneﬁt from ample operation room availability during
subsequent days than patients arriving before the weekend.12
12We deﬁne operation room availability within four days of a patient’s arrival, measuring it during during
four weekdays for patients arriving on Sundays or Mondays, during three weekdays for patients arriving on
Tuesdays or Saturdays, and during two weekdays for patients arriving on Wednesdays, Thursdays, or Fridays.
46Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Operation Room Availability Quintile
Operation Room Availability Quintile
123 4 5
Operation Room Availability -2.822 -0.2958* 0.973* 2.111* 3.957*
Operative Delay 45.11 41.82 41.42 40.83 40.32*
Outcomes
Death (30 Days) 0.074 0.057 0.050 0.055 0.048
Readmission (30 Days) 0.239 0.250 0.196 0.229 0.220
Reoperation (90 Days) 0.031 0.036 0.030 0.023 0.027
Infection (90 Days) 0.191 0.224 0.201 0.182 0.184
Transfusion (24 Hours) 0.018 0.034 0.038 0.026 0.022
Patient Characteristics
Age 79.60 80.26 79.72 80.36 79.33
Percent Male 0.308 0.320 0.304 0.281 0.298
Percent White 0.964 0.923 0.922 0.953 0.937
Charlson 3.112 2.835 2.972 2.662 3.080
Timing
Hour Of Day 14.46 14.01 13.02* 12.20* 12.36*
Day Of Week 3.303 3.887* 4.339* 4.231* 4.690*
Observations 393 388 398 385 413
Notes: This table shows summary statistics by quintile of operation room avail-
ability across all attending trauma surgeons within four days of patient arrival.
* denotes signiﬁcant difference from the bottom quintile at the 5 percent level,
computed using standard errors clustered by admission date.
2.3.2 Operation Room Availability and Operative Delays
Figure 2.3 visualizes the relationship between operation room availability and operative
delay, adjusting for hour and weekday ﬁxed effects. Evidently, operative delays decrease
with operation room availability. Operative delays average between 45 and 50 hours when
operation room availability is low, but decrease to below 40 hours when operation room
availability is high.
Table 2.2 investigates the impact of operation room availability on operative delay in
more detail. In Column 1, we estimate this relationship without any covariates. The resulting
coefﬁcient suggests that each unit of operation room availability — corresponding to an
already available surgery slot by one of the attending trauma surgeons within the next
473
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Figure 2.3: Operation Room Availability and Operative Delays
four days — reduces operative delays by about 46 minutes. In Column 2, we add hour
and weekday ﬁxed effects, which have a substantial impact on the relationship between
operation room availability and operative delay, resulting in an estimate of 62 minutes. We
add patient covariates in Column 3 and physician ﬁxed effects in Column 4, resulting in
estimates of approximately 69 minutes.
To put these results into perspective, we multiply the coefﬁcient estimates obtained in
Table 2.2 by 2.44, a one standard deviation increase in operation room availability. Based
on the coefﬁcient estimate reported in Column 4, a one standard deviation increase in
operation room availability decreases operative delay by 2.8 hours or 6.8 percent of the
average operative delay. More intuitively, an attending trauma surgeon conducts about three
operations per operation day. Consequently, if an additional day of operation room capacity
48Table 2.2: Operation Room Availability and Operative Delays
Operative Delay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Operation Room Availability -0.767** -1.042*** -1.153*** -1.156***
(0.318) (0.342) (0.337) (0.336)
Time Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Patient Effects No No Yes Yes
Physician Effects No No No Yes
Observations 1977 1977 1977 1977
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.024 0.047 0.047
Mean Operative Delay 41.886 41.886 41.886 41.886
Notes: This table reports the effect of operation room availability on operative
delays. Models are estimated by OLS and standard errors are clustered by ad-
mission date. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and
ten percent level, respectively.
was available at the time of patient arrival, the corresponding operative delay would be
expected to be about 8 percent lower.
The most important ﬁnding documented in Table 2.2 is that the effect of operation room
availability on operative delays is highly signiﬁcant. We focus on the coefﬁcient estimate
reported in Column 4, because here we include all of the covariates used in our subsequent
analysis. The T-statistic in Column 4 — obtained by dividing the coefﬁcient estimate by
its standard error — is 3.44. We compute the corresponding F-statistic by squaring the
T-statistic, resulting in an estimate of 11.83. Importantly, this value exceeds 10, the value
recommended as threshold for separating weak from strong instruments (Staiger and Stock
1997, Stock et al. 2002). We conclude that operation room availability is a strong enough
instrumental variable.
Besides being correlated strongly with operative delays, operation room availability must
not be otherwise correlated with patient outcomes — at least conditional on covariates — to
be a valid instrumental variable. If patient characteristics or provided care varied system
with operation room availability, it would not only impact operative delays, but also patient
outcomes.
49Patients arriving with a hip fracture in the emergency room require immediate attention
and in all likelihood do not time their arrival. We note, however, that patient characteristics
might differ across hours of the day and day of the week. For instance, we expect to
see more sport-related hip fractures during the weekend. To the extent that operation
room availability also varies across hours and weekdays, this phenomenon might induce
a systematic relationship between operation room availability and patient characteristics,
violating the assumption that our instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error term.
To address this issue, we control for ﬁxed effects of the hour of the day and the day of the
week in all of our analyses. Conditional on these covariates, it appears unlikely that patient
characteristics vary systematically with operation room availability in a way that would bias
our results.
Even if patient characteristics did not vary with operation room availability, operation
room availability might be still be correlated with the quality of provided care. If the
quality of provided care subsequently inﬂuenced patient outcomes, the independence of
the instrumental variable and the error term would be violated, implying that operation
room availability is not a valid instrument. The most immediate concern is that patients
may be operated by a fellow instead of an attending trauma surgeon during periods of low
operation room availability. Consequently, we include indicators for the surgeon performing
the operation. We believe that conditional on these covariates, provided care does not vary
with operation room availability. Nonetheless, we note that the validity of our ﬁndings
crucially depends on this assumption. Our results are biased to the extent that unobserved
covariates vary with both operation room availability and provided care.
2.3.3 Operative Delays and Patient Outcomes
Table 2.3 reports our main results. In Panel A, we present estimates of the effect of operative
delays on patient outcomes based on regular ordinary least squares (OLS) models. In Panel
B, we show estimates of the same effect, this time using instrumental variable (IV) models
exploiting the relationship between operation room availability and operative delays. All
50Table 2.3: Operative Delays and Patient Outcomes
Death Readmission Reoperation Infection Transfusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS
Operative Delay 0.063*** 0.068** 0.034** 0.087*** 0.036**
(0.021) (0.030) (0.014) (0.032) (0.014)
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.083 0.029 0.053 0.005
Panel B: IV
Operative Delay 0.182 -0.100 0.161 0.294 0.030
(0.198) (0.360) (0.149) (0.352) (0.119)
Adjusted R2 -0.008 0.067 -0.026 0.026 0.004
First Stage F-Statistic 11.834 11.834 11.834 11.834 11.834
Observations 1977 1977 1977 1977 1977
Mean Outcome 5.665 22.661 2.933 19.626 2.731
Notes: This table reports estimates of the impact of operative delays on patient outcomes. Coef-
ﬁcients are multiplied by 100 and can be interpreted as percentages. Models control for time,
patient, and physician effects as described in Section 2.2.1. Standard errors are clustered by
admission date. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent level,
respectively.
models account for patient characteristics described in Section 2.2.1 as well as physician,
hour, weekday, and year ﬁxed effects. All of the coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 and can
be interpreted as percentages.
Panel A shows that there is substantial and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between
operative delays and all patient outcomes considered in this study. According to Column
1, an additional hour of operative delay increases the mortality rate within 30 days of the
operation by 0.06 percent. Consequently, delaying the operation by one more day is expected
to increase death by 1.51 percent. Relative to the sample mortality rate of 5.67 percent,
an additional day of operative delay increases the mortality odds by 26.63 percent. This
estimate is broadly in line with estimates previously reported in the literature.
The effects of operative delay on reoperation and transfusion are similar to its effect on
death. Meanwhile, the odds of readmission and infection are less — but still signiﬁcantly —
51affected by operative delay. Delaying the operation of a patient by an additional day increases
the probability of readmission by 1.63 percent, reoperation by 0.82 percent, infection by
2.09 percent, and transfusion by 0.86 percent. The corresponding odds ratios relative to the
sample mean are 7.20 percent for readmission, 27.82 percent for reoperation, 10.64 percent
for infection, and 31.63 percent for transfusion.
Panel B presents the IV estimates. Estimates are generally insigniﬁcant. Taken at face
value, the IV estimates — with the exception of readmission — tend be positive and at
least as large as the OLS estimates. The impact of operative delay on death and infection
is approximately three times larger using IV instead of OLS estimates. The IV estimates
for reoperation are almost ﬁve times as large as the corresponding OLS estimate. Though
imprecisely estimated, all of these estimates suggest that correlation between operative delay
and patient outcome is not solely related to differences in patient characteristics. By contrast,
readmission rates appear to decrease with operative delay according to Column 2 of Panel B.
Besides statistical noise, one potential explanation for this ﬁnding could be that patients
whose operation is delayed stay longer in the hospital and experience complications during
this time, while patients who are treated earlier are also discharged earlier and need to be
readmitted for early complications.
2.3.4 Robustness
The IV estimates presented in Table 2.3 are statistically insigniﬁcant, providing very limited
information on the causal impact of operative delays on patient outcomes. One potential
explanation for this phenomenon is that the relationship between operation room availability
and operative delays — while statistically signiﬁcant — is fairly small. As documented in
Table 2.1, moving from the bottom to the top quintile of operation room availability observed
in our data reduces the average operative delay by less than ﬁve hours. At the same time,
outcomes are quite noisy as is evident both in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1. Consequently, the
IV estimates are based on small variation in operative delays and predict noisy variation of
outcomes, leading to large standard errors.
52In Table 2.4, we consider different speciﬁcations of operative delay, hoping that operation
room availability predicting these measures of treatment delay more accurately. If this
was the case, the resulting IV estimates should be more precise. We specify two variables
indicating whether operative delay exceeds 24 or 48 hours, respectively.13 Corresponding
estimates are presented in Columns 2 and 3, while Column 1 repeats the baseline estimate
previously shown in Column 1 of Table 2.3. In Table 2.4, we report estimates using death
as outcome variable. We note that we obtain substantially similar results for the other
outcomes considered in this study.
The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic reported in Column 2 is substantially larger than the corre-
sponding ﬁgure of the baseline speciﬁcation shown in Column 1, suggesting that operation
room availability predicts operative delay of more than 24 hours more precisely than overall
operative delay. Unfortunately, this improved ﬁrst-stage regression does not translate to
more precise estimates. In both Columns 1 and 2, the IV estimates of operative delay on
death roughly triple relative to the corresponding OLS estimates but at the same time
become statistically insigniﬁcant. Meanwhile, specifying operative delay exceeding 48 hours
as explanatory variable — reported in Column 3 — results in a ﬁrst-stage F-statistic that is
just half as big as the F-statistic corresponding to the OLS speciﬁcation.
Finally, we consider whether outliers have an impact on our results in Column 4. In this
speciﬁcation, we only consider patients operated within 96 hours of admission, excluding
about 5 percent of patients that had to wait longest for their operation. Relative to the
baseline estimate in Column 1, the OLS estimate is slightly larger, while the IV estimate is
somewhat smaller. The ratio of IV to the OLS estimate drops from almost three to slightly
more than two, unsurprisingly suggesting that our estimates are quite sensitive to sample
speciﬁcation.
1364 and 28 percent of patients are not treated within 24 and 48 hours, respectively.
53Table 2.4: Operative Delays and Death
Death
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Operative Delay 0.063*** 0.073***
(0.021) (0.028)
Operative Delay > 24 Hours 3.727***
(1.025)
Operative Delay > 48 Hours 3.948***
(1.346)
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.016
Panel B: IV
Operative Delay 0.182 0.141
(0.198) (0.242)
Operative Delay > 24 Hours 10.324
(11.243)
Operative Delay > 48 Hours 17.167
(19.278)
Adjusted R2 -0.008 -0.002 N/A 0.013
First Stage F-Statistic 11.834 17.389 6.101 15.366
Observations 1977 1977 1977 1857
Mean Outcome 5.665 5.665 5.665 5.331
Notes: This table reports estimates of the impact of operative delays on death
within 30 days of the operation. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100 and can be
interpreted as percentages. Models control for time, patient, and physician
effects as described in Section 2.2.1. Standard errors are clustered by admis-
sion date. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten
percent level, respectively.
2.4 Discussion
We ﬁnd that operative delays are substantially and signiﬁcantly correlated with higher
mortality, readmission, reoperation, infection, and transfusion rates after hip fractures. The
causal effects underlying this relationship remain unclear. Using operation room availability
as instrumental variable allows for causal interpretation, but results in noisy estimates.
542.4.1 Implications
Understanding the relationship between operative delay and patient outcomes is crucial
to assess to which extent operations may be delayed. While we are unable to determine
the extent to which delaying treatment causally deteriorates patient outcomes, our ﬁndings
generally do not suggest that operative delays matter less than suggested by their correlation
with patient outcomes. Contrary to our expectation, unobservable differences in patient
characteristics — at least according to our very imprecise ﬁndings — do not seem to account
for the bulk of the relationship between operative delays and patient outcomes. If these
ﬁndings were to be conﬁrmed in additional studies, the implications are clear: Operative
delays should be avoided with urgency and their impact on patient outcomes cannot simply
be disregarded as related to case severity.
2.4.2 Limitations
Several limitations of this study deserve further discussion. First and foremost, operation
room availability constitutes an instrumental variable that may have both theoretical and
practical issues. From a theoretical perspective, it remains debatable whether the availability
of operation rooms is truly independent of patient outcomes besides its impact on operative
delays. Another concern is whether we capture operation room availability precisely enough.
In practice, the ﬁrst-stage relationship between operation room availability and operative
delays is signiﬁcant but fairly small, presumably leading to the enormous standard errors
we observe when estimating the effect of operative delays on outcomes.
A second important limitation concerns the speciﬁc circumstances of our setting. As a
major teaching hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital disposes over a large number of
orthopedic surgeons. Consequently, major delays are very rare and almost always related
to medical reasons rather than operation room and surgeon availability. Consequently,
about 80 percent of patients are treated within the two days following their admission. The
resulting variation in operative delays that is not related to patient characteristics is likely
smaller than in a hospital with more constrained resources, complicating identiﬁcation.
55Finally, some data issues deserve being mentioned. We observe the time of a patient’s
arrival in the emergency room, but do not know the initial fracture time. This unobservable
variable may affect patient outcomes. However, as long as initial fracture time is unrelated
to operation room availability — which we believe to be the case — it would not bias
instrumental variable estimates. Meanwhile, some of the patient outcomes — readmission,
reoperation, and infection — are only tracked within the hospital and are only measurable
if the patient is still alive, potentially biasing our estimates.
56Chapter 3
Concentrated and Broad Team Familiarity:
Evidence from Orthopedic Surgery1
3.1 Introduction
Numerous organizations assemble professionals in teams to complete a single project
(Edmondson and Nembhard 2009, Huckman and Staats 2011). Subsequently, these teams
are disassembled and their members are assigned to new projects. Arrow and McGrath (1995)
have characterized these teams as ﬂuid. The beneﬁts of ﬂuid teams are typically understood
in terms of increased ﬂexibility, enabling organizations to simplify the assignment of projects
to individuals. Relying on ﬂuid teams, however, implies that team members are less familiar
with each other than in traditional settings where teams remain intact across projects.
Studying the familiarity of ﬂuid teams is complicated by the substantial variation of
their familiarity across team members and over time. The usual measure of team familiarity
— the number of past collaborations — frequently ﬂuctuates within ﬂuid teams. Some
members of ﬂuid teams may have frequently collaborated in the past, while other members
may have never worked together before. In addition, ﬂuid teams collaborate in irregular
intervals. Consequently, their familiarity varies with the number of recent collaborations
to the extent that team familiarity decays. By contrast, traditional teams typically keep
1Co-authored with Robert S. Huckman and David Ring.
57working together across projects, suggesting that team familiarity neither varies across team
members nor decays.
We address the varying degrees of familiarity within a ﬂuid team by distinguishing
between concentrated and broad team familiarity. In its extreme form, concentrated team
familiarity stems from past collaboration between two team members involved in the focal
project. In contrast, the broadest measure of team familiarity captures prior collaborations
involving all members of the focal team. Developing broad familiarity is often cited as a
beneﬁt of creating dedicated teams. As we see in our context, the breadth of familiarity
can be theoretically viewed as a continuum running between these extremes. Separating a
team’s past projects based on the number of members involved in both the past and the focal
project enables us to account for variations in familiarity within ﬂuid teams. Subsequently,
we analyze how concentrated and broad team familiarity affect team performance over
different time periods, testing whether team familiarity decays.
Understanding how ﬂuid teams develop familiarity is crucial for any organization
weighing the costs and beneﬁts of relying on such teams. The impact of familiarity on the
performance of ﬂuid teams has been acknowledged by theoretical contributions (Edmondson
and Nembhard 2009) and studied in a number of empirical settings. Katz (1982) examines the
impact on familiarity on communication patterns based on cross-sectional data. Edmondson
et al. (2001) provide qualitative evidence that team familiarity and communication affect
learning. This notion is conﬁrmed by Reagans et al. (2005) and Huckman et al. (2009),
who demonstrate that familiarity improves the performance of ﬂuids teams in surgery and
software services. Similarly, Huckman and Pisano (2006) ﬁnd that individual performance is
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and suggest that team familiarity might be an important determinant of these
variations in cardiac surgery.
We extend this literature in two ways. First, distinguishing between concentrated and
broad team familiarity adds an important dimension to the decision organizations face when
relying on ﬂuid teams. Presumably, less coordination — such as customized scheduling
of staff — is required to increase concentrated team familiarity. That said, the beneﬁts of
58a given amount of broad team familiarity might be greater than that created by the same
amount of concentrated team familiarity. Similarly, organizations are confronted with a
trade-off regarding the stability of ﬂuid teams. Depending on the relative accumulation and
decay of beneﬁts from concentrated versus broad familiarity, it might be optimal to keep
ﬂuid teams together for extended periods of time.
Our empirical analyses focus on orthopedic surgeries conducted at a major academic
medical center in the United States. In this setting, dozens of surgeons and hundreds of
assisting surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses are assigned to ﬂuid teams to perform
surgeries. This process leads to substantial variation in team familiarity across the procedures
in our sample. Mandatory operation reports enable us to track team assignments over several
years and link them to procedure duration, a well-established performance measure of
surgical procedures (Pisano et al. 2001, Edmondson et al. 2003, Reagans et al. 2005). Though
this measure is primarily concerned with efﬁciency, it is also correlated with surgical site
infections (Leong et al. 2006), perioperative mobility (Kessler et al. 2003), and survival (Ong
et al. 2008) for certain types of procedures.
In this setting, team experience can be measured by the number of past operations
performed jointly by team members collaborating on the focal operation. Subsequently, we
distinguish past operations based on the number of team members associated with both the
past and the focal procedure. We ﬁnd that past operations reduce procedure duration more if
they involve more of the focal team’s members. Broad familiarity — developed in operations
involving the surgeon and two or more other team members — reduces procedure duration
by more than twice as much as concentrated familiarity developed in collaborations between
the surgeon and one other team member. These effects are most pronounced for operations
conducted on the same day before the focal operation. Operations conducted 1–10 days
before the focal surgery have a way smaller, but otherwise similar and statistically signiﬁcant
effect on procedure duration. By contrast, procedure duration is not affected by any type of
operations conducted more than 10 days before the focal operation. We conclude that — at
least in our setting — the familiarity of a team fades quickly.
593.2 Familiarity of Fluid Teams
We study operations performed by orthopedic surgeons jointly with assisting surgeons,
anesthesiologists, and nurses. These teams are assigned based on the team members’
schedules. Within this setting, teams are ﬂuid and exhibit varying degrees of familiarity
within the same team as well as enormous ﬂuctuation in the number of recent collaborations.
That is, a surgeon may have collaborated frequently with the assisting surgeon but not
with the anesthesiologist. Meanwhile, a surgeon may have collaborated with the assisting
surgeon frequently in the past week in some instances and never in the past week in other
circumstances. Accurately measuring a team’s familiarity in this context is challenging.
Numerous studies measure the familiarity of a team by counting the number of projects
its members conducted jointly during a given time period. In traditional settings, this
measure captures team experience reasonably well. In these settings, teams usually involve
the same members over time, implying a standard learning curve accurately reﬂected by
the number of past projects or units completed. By contrast, measuring the familiarity
of ﬂuid teams is complicated by the two issues we anecdotally described in the previous
paragraph. First, the number of past cooperations can vary substantially across pairwise
combinations of individuals within a team. Second, to the extent team familiarity decays, it
ﬂuctuates constantly with the number of recent collaborations. In this paper, we investigate
the empirical importance of both of these factors.
3.2.1 Measuring Team Familiarity
Fluid teams frequently feature varying degrees of pairwise familiarity between various
combinations of two members of the same team. Some pairs of team members may have
collaborated very often in the past, while other members may barely know each other.
Across numerous settings, shared experience developed among some, but not all, team
members constitutes a major determinant of overall team familiarity. Consequently, the
familiarity of ﬂuid teams is not accurately captured by the number of previous cooperations
involving all team members.
60Previous research deﬁnes team familiarity based on the number of collaborations among
pairs of team members. Capturing team familiarity at the level of a pair — the smallest unit
of a team — is intuitively appealing, because it accounts for any potential source of team
familiarity. Pairwise collaborations are aggregated across the whole team to compute its
familiarity. The aggregation of pairwise collaborations implicitly deﬁnes the importance of
each pairwise collaboration for the overall familiarity of the team. Typically, each pairwise
collaboration is weighted equally. We analyze the implications of this assumption.
Reagans et al. (2005) and Huckman et al. (2009) deﬁne team familiarity as follows:
Team Familiarity =
N
Â
i=1
N
Â
j=1
Pij
N(N 1)
2
(3.1)
P denotes the number of past projects involving both team member i and team member j
belonging to the N team members performing the focal project. Team familiarity is computed
by summing P across all N team members, implying that all pairwise collaborations are
weighted equally. Subsequently, the sum of pairwise collaborations is divided by
N(N 1)
2 to
compare the familiarity of teams including a varying number of team members. We ignore
this adjustment because we focus on measuring the familiarity of teams that are composed
of the same number of members.
The plausibility of (3.1) as a measure of team familiarity relies on the assumption that
each of the pairwise collaborations contributes to shared experience in a similar way. That is,
a three-member team in which all three members have worked together exactly once before
would be assumed to have the same level of team familiarity as a three-member team where
one pair of members has worked together twice and another pair has worked together once
and the third pair has not worked together at all. This assumption yields at least three
testable implications. First, it implies that a pairwise collaboration of any two team members
affects team familiarity in the same way regardless of their importance to the team. Second,
team familiarity increases linearly with the number of pairwise collaborations. Finally, team
familiarity does not depend on whether pairwise collaborations were accumulated across
different projects or within a single project. We test the plausibility of the ﬁnal implication.
61In many teams — including the surgical teams we study — certain members may play
leadership roles that make their familiarity with other team members particularly important
in determining performance. In the case of orthopedic surgery, one can measurably claim
that the surgeon exerts a greater inﬂuence on patient outcomes than the other members of
a surgical team. That is, assuming that pairwise collaborations of any two team members
impact team familiarity equally appears implausible in this setting. We address this issue by
measuring familiarity only using past operations that included the surgeon. Subsequently,
we test whether pairwise collaborations of the surgeon and any other team member have a
comparable inﬂuence on team performance.
3.2.2 Concentrated and Broad Team Familiarity
According to the traditional measure deﬁned in (3.1), team familiarity does not account
for disproportional beneﬁts arising from the collaboration of more than two of the focal
team members. Consider a surgical team consisting of a surgeon, an assisting surgeon,
and an anesthesiologist. An operation involving all three team members would increase
team familiarity by two units.2 The same increase in team familiarity is achieved by two
operations involving the surgeon and one of the other team members.
We investigate this question by distinguishing previous cases based on the number of
involved team members, separating concentrated and broad team familiarity. We deﬁne
concentrated team familiarity as the number of past collaborations conducted jointly by
two — but no more — of the focal team members. Broad team familiarity is deﬁned as the
number of past collaborations involving three or more of the focal team members. Based
on prior work regarding team familiarity, we would expect both concentrated and broad
team familiarity to improve performance. As broad familiarity is built on more pairwise
collaborations than concentrated familiarity, we expect that:
Hypothesis 1. Broad team familiarity improves team performance more than concentrated team
familiarity.
2Pairwise collaborations not involving the surgeon are ignored as the surgeon is the central team member.
62Put differently, we hypothesize that the beneﬁts of concentrated team familiarity —
stemming from a single pairwise collaboration — are exceeded by the advantages of broad
team familiarity stemming from multiple pairwise interactions. This hypothesis raises an
obvious question: How much more does broad team familiarity improve team performance
relative to concentrated team familiarity?
We compare concentrated and broad team familiarity based on the corresponding num-
ber of pairwise collaborations. For instance, a three-member team in which all members
collaborated once would have accumulated one unit of broad familiarity and three units
of pairwise collaboration. Meanwhile, a three-member team in which two members col-
laborated once would have developed one unit of concentrated familiarity and one unit
of pairwise collaboration. Here, we wonder whether broad familiarity improves team
performance by three times as much as concentrated familiarity.
Theoretically, the relative impact of concentrated and broad familiarity on team perfor-
mance is ambiguous. Consider a three-member team in which two members collaborated in
the past with another individual not involved in the focal project. Replacing this individual
with the third focal team member may improve performance by less than the the three-fold
increase in pairwise collaborations. On the other hand, familiarity developed jointly among
most or all team members during the same project may have beneﬁts exceeding the increase
in pairwise collaborations.
Besides capturing a different type of pairwise collaboration — performed in bulk during
the same project rather than in isolation across distinct projects — broad team familiarity
differs from concentrated team familiarity because it ensures that familiarity across a team
is balanced. By contrast, concentrated familiarity may be unbalanced if it is concentrated
among some team members. As the traditional measure of team familiarity increases linearly
with the number of pairwise collaborations, the balance of these collaborations across team
members does not affect team familiarity. That is, a three-member team in which two team
members collaborated twice in the past has the same concentrated familiarity as a three
member-team in which one member collaborated with each of the other members once.
63In our empirical investigation, we explore how team performance varies with its famil-
iarity captured by (3.1), concentrated familiarity, and broad team familiarity. We distinguish
between pairwise estimates according to (3.1) and teamwise estimates based on our concept
of concentrated and broad team familiarity. Considering pairwise and teamwise estimates
gives us a reference point for the comparison of concentrated and broad team familiarity.
In addition, it enables to assess the plausibility of (3.1), testing whether the relationship
between team familiarity implied by (3.1) and the number of team members involved in
both the past and the focal project is supported empirically.3
We focus on the overall impact on concentrated and broad team familiarity and are
unable to disentangle the various sources potentially accounting for differences between
concentrated and broad team familiarity. It thus remains unclear whether our ﬁndings stem
from decreasing or increasing returns to pairwise collaborations or from improved balance
of familiarity implied by broad team familiarity.
3.2.3 Decay of Team Familiarity
Due to frequent changes in team composition, the familiarity of ﬂuid teams constantly shifts.
In some situations, a surgeon and an assisting surgeon may have collaborated 10 times in
the past 10 days. In contrast, at a different point in time, the same surgeon and assisting
surgeon may not have collaborated at all during the prior 10 days. We consider whether
team performance ﬂuctuates across these situations. Put differently, we ask whether team
familiarity decays. This question becomes relevant as one moves away from traditional
settings in which the core of a given team may stay intact across several projects. Prior work
on learning has found that the beneﬁts of individual or ﬁrm experience decay over time.
Like experience, we would expect that the beneﬁts of team familiarity may decay as well,
leading us to hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. The beneﬁts of both concentrated and broad team familiarity decay.
3According to (3.1), a past project involving two, three, four, and ﬁve team members yield one, three, six,
and 10 units of pairwise collaboration, respectively. Thus, the relative importance of concentrated and broad
team familiarity is determined a priori.
64We test this notion by comparing how team performance is affected by team familiarity
stemming from the most recent past and team familiarity accrued in the more distant past.
These time periods are mutually exclusive. Based on these measures, we estimate whether
team familiarity developed some time ago impacts team performance even when we control
for team familiarity developed in the recent past.
3.3 Setting and Data
3.3.1 Setting
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) is major academic medical center located in Boston,
Massachusetts. The hospital provides care across all specialties of medicine and is designated
as a Level I Trauma Center. As of 2013, physicians at the hospital admit approximately
48,000 inpatients, manage nearly 1,500,000 outpatient visits, and perform more than 38,000
operations on an annual basis.
Our analysis focuses on the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at MGH. This department
accounts for about 8 percent of all patient discharges and typically performs more than 30
percent of the total number of operations at MGH. We observe more than 50 orthopedic
surgeons performing a meaningful number of operations at MGH. They perform surgeries
in collaboration with hundreds of assisting surgeons, anesthesiologist, and nurses, resulting
in an enormous number of potential team assignments. Teams are very ﬂuid in this setting,
frequently assembled for just a single operation. Importantly, the assignment of teams
depend mostly on the schedules and availability of personnel which are determined way in
advance. Individual surgeons have very limited impact on selecting team members. Thus, it
appears unlikely that team performance affects team assignment, a feature that is crucial for
our identiﬁcation strategy.
Besides constant and substantial variation in team composition, orthopedic operations
lend themselves to the analysis of team performance for several other reasons. Team perfor-
mance can be accurately tracked by procedure duration, a well-established performance
65measure (Pisano et al. 2001, Edmondson et al. 2003, Reagans et al. 2005). This measure
provides substantial variation both within and across surgeons. Furthermore, procedure
duration clearly does not only depend on the surgeon’s performance, but also on the
efﬁciency of collaboration across the whole team. We capture both team composition and
procedure duration from mandatory operation reports.4
3.3.2 Data
Our data includes all operations performed at the Department of Orthopedics at MGH
from 2008–2011.5 We observe 45,662 operations performed by 202 surgeons. 52 surgeons
performed more than 100 operations during the observation period. Besides the surgeon,
these data report the assisting surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses associated with the
operation. This feature enables us to track how often an individual worked together with
another professional or group of professionals over various time periods, constituting our
measure of team familiarity.
In addition, our data identiﬁes the type of procedure based on ICD-9 codes, the time
and duration of the procedure, and the operation room where the operation took place. We
beneﬁt from a large number of patient characteristics, comprising the patient’s Charlson
index — a compound measure of comorbidity severity — in addition to age, gender, race
and marital status (Charlson et al. 1987, Quan et al. 2011). The Charlson index is computed
based on all diagnoses ever given to a patient at MGH before the operation date.6
Orthopedic surgeries are conducted by a team of surgeons, anesthesiologists, and nurses.
These teams vary in size and composition depending on the requirements of a procedure
and the availability of personnel. We focus on operations involving a surgeon, an assisting
4Relying on procedure duration as outcome enables us to pool different types of orthopedic surgeries for
empirical analysis. Other quality measures are not easily comparable across different procedure types.
5This data excludes operations on MGH employees.
6Primary ICD-9 codes are missing for 1,452 patients. Procedure duration is missing for 233 patients. The
operation room is missing for 173 patients. The Charlson index is missing for 214 patients. Race is missing for
1,455 patients. Marital status is missing for 1,374 patients.
66surgeon — who could be a resident, fellow, or board-certiﬁed surgeon — an anesthesiologist,
a circulating nurse, and a scrub nurse. These ﬁve professionals constitute the core surgical
team.7 We focus on the ﬁrst operation of each patient during the observation period.8 Our
ﬁnal analysis sample consists of 25,180 operations.9
3.3.3 Fluidity of Surgical Teams
As we observe operations involving 202 surgeons, 476 assisting surgeons, 376 anesthesi-
ologists, 346 circulating nurses, and 452 scrub nurses, we expect substantial variation in
the composition of the core surgical teams. Considering the surgeon as the focal team
member, we calculate how often the surgeon collaborated with a given assisting surgeon,
anesthesiologist, or nurse based on all available data. These calculations deﬁne the share of
operations a surgeon conducts with a given other team member.
Based on a surgeon’s collaboration shares, we calculate the Herﬁndahl index — a
commonly used measure for market concentration — of the respective surgeon:
H
Anesthesiologist
s = Â
a
(
Operationss,a
Operationss
)2 (3.2)
H
Anesthesiologist
s denotes the Herﬁndahl assessing the collaboration intensity between anes-
thesiologists indexed by a and surgeon s. Operations denotes the number of operations by
the subscripted team members. We compute a Herﬁndahl index of collaboration intensity
across all surgeons by weighting individual surgeon indices by their number of operations:
HAnesthesiologist = Â
s
H
Anesthesiologist
s ⇤
Operationss
Operations
(3.3)
Here, Operations denotes the number of operations conducted by all surgeons during the
observation period. We proceed analogously with assisting surgeons and nurses.
711,484 operations were not performed by a core surgical team. In more than 10,000 of these operations, no
assisting surgeon was participating in the operation.
89,248 operations were not primary operations.
9We use all 45,662 operations to compute individual and team experience.
67Table 3.1: Surgeons’ Collaboration Concentration
Assistant Anesthesiologist Scrub Circulator
Herﬁndahl Index (Percent) 4.37 11.23 6.26 8.91
Notes: This table shows the Herﬁndahl index representing the concentration of the
surgeons’ collaboration with each type of team member represented in a surgical team.
The indices are computed individually for each surgeon and subsequently averaged
across surgeons. Finally, surgeons are weighted by operation frequency.
Table 3.1 present the various Herﬁndahl indices translated to percentages. None of
the indices exceeds 15 percent, indicating that collaboration is fairly unconcentrated. The
importance of this lack of concentration is addressed below in our discussion of team
assignment. It should be noted that the collaboration intensity between surgeons and
assisting surgeons is biased downwards by the fact that some of the residents and fellows
were working at MGH only for a portion of the observation period. Residents work at MGH
for a ﬁve-year period straight out of medical school, where the ﬁrst year is the internship.
After completing residency at MGH or another hospitals, surgeons may complete a one-year
fellowship. Most surgeons leave MGH after completing their education, working at different
hospitals or in private practice.
3.3.4 Assignment of Surgical Teams
Analyzing the relationship between team familiarity and team performance is typically
complicated by the fact that teams do not form randomly. Rather, teams performing well
might choose to work together more frequently, resulting in a spurious correlation between
familiarity and performance. Addressing this issue requires variation in the assignment of
teams that is both rich and exogenous.
In our empirical setting, teams are composed primarily based on the type of operation
and on the availability of employees and facilities. We adjust for the ﬁrst factor by controlling
for the primary ICD-9 code of each operation. Meanwhile, the availability of employees
and facilities is largely random. Employee schedules are typically ﬁxed before operations
are scheduled. A substantial number of operations constitute emergencies and cannot be
68scheduled at all. Surgeons have very limited impact on team assignment, reﬂected by the
low collaboration intensity with other members of the surgical team reported in Table 3.1.
The assignment of surgical teams is fairly random across days, but tends to exhibit
substantial autocorrelation within days. Once a team has been composed to perform an
operation at the start of the day, it is much more likely to stay together for the rest of the
day than pure randomness would suggest. We note that this decision is not driven by
the team’s performance, but rather by scheduling considerations. The exact duration of
operations is hard to predict, implying that keeping a team together avoids idle time for
all team members. Consequently, surgical teams are more familiar with each other during
operations that are scheduled later in the day. We address this issue below.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Measuring Team Familiarity
As discussed in Section 3.2, we follow a large literature measuring the familiarity of a team
using the volume of previous collaborations. However, we distinguish past operations based
on the number of team members participating in both the past and the focal operation.
Based on this distinction, we are able to separately consider the impact of concentrated and
broad familiarity on team performance.
As noted previously, we consider the surgeon as the central team member. Thus, we
ignore past operations not involving the surgeon when computing team familiarity. Though
there is reason to expect the surgeon to be the central team member, we could alternatively
specify concentrated and broad team familiarity by considering all team members as equally
relevant. We report estimates based on both speciﬁcations and note that our results hold in
either scenario. Besides the surgeon, a surgical team consists of four other team members
discussed in Section 3.3.2. Consequently, we distinguish past operations performed by the
surgeon based on whether one, two, three or four other team members collaborated with
the surgeon in both the past and the focal operation.
69Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Outcome
Duration (Minutes) 25180 138.36 85.74
Surgeon
Operations 0 Days 25180 1.56 1.80
Operations 1–10 Days 24932 9.47 7.08
Operations 11–20 Days 24748 9.79 7.33
Surgeon & 1 Team Member
Operations 0 Days 25180 0.24 0.72
Operations 1–10 Days 24932 3.45 3.69
Operations 11–20 Days 24748 3.19 3.71
Surgeon & 2 Team Members
Operations 0 Days 25180 0.15 0.55
Operations 1–10 Days 24932 0.90 1.84
Operations 11–20 Days 24748 0.84 1.86
Surgeon & 3 Team Members
Operations 0 Days 25180 0.29 0.67
Operations 1–10 Days 24932 0.18 0.76
Operations 11–20 Days 24748 0.17 0.78
Surgeon & 4 Team Members
Operations 0 Days 25180 0.52 0.86
Operations 1–10 Days 24932 0.02 0.23
Operations 11–20 Days 24748 0.01 0.20
Pair of Surgeon & Team Member
Operations 0 Days 25180 3.49 4.17
Operations 1–10 Days 24932 5.87 6.74
Operations 11–20 Days 24748 5.42 6.84
Other Variables
Experience (Years) 21350 14.97 9.01
Complexity (Work RVU) 20532 12.62 7.36
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the key variables of our analyses.
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the most important variables analyzed in
this paper. On average, an operation considered in this study takes about 138 minutes.
This duration is deﬁned by the time the patient enters and leaves the operation room. We
report a surgeon’s number of operations performed during the same day, within 1–10 days,
and within 11–20 days before the focal operation. On average, a surgeon performs 1.56
700 20 40 60 80 100
Percent
11-20 Days
1-10 Days
0 Days
0 Team Members 1 Team Member
2 Team Members 3 Team Members
4 Team Members
Notes: This ﬁgure distinguishes a surgeon’s prior operations on the same day, within 1–10 days, and
within 11–20 days before the focal operation based on the number of team members that collaborated
with the surgeon in both the past and the focal procedure.
Figure 3.1: Prior Surgeon Operations and Focal Team Members
operations on the same day before starting the focal operation. The corresponding averages
within 1–10 days and 11–20 days of the focal operation are slightly less than 10 operations.
Figure 3.1 visualizes how a surgeon’s operations are distributed across the number of
team members participating both the past and the focal operation. On the day of the focal
operation — denoted as 0 days — each operation type appears frequently. About 75 percent
of operations involve at least one team member besides the surgeon. Every third operation
is performed by all team members. By contrast, the percentage of operations involving
three or four team members besides the surgeon is very small within 1–10 days and 11–20
days before the focal procedure. Thus, we focus on the day of the focal operation to analyze
the effects of concentrated and broad team familiarity in detail. Subsequently, we group
71operations involving two or more additional team members together to examine the decay
of team familiarity.
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, surgical teams are likely to collaborate in subsequent
operations during the same day due to scheduling considerations. Consequently, teams
performing operations later in the day are typically more familiar with each other. To the
extent that surgeries scheduled later in the day are shorter — even when holding team
familiarity constant — the observed relationship between team familiarity and procedure
duration is biased. Surgeons tend to schedule easier procedures later in the day, making
this a relevant concern. We address this issue by accounting for the number of operations
that a surgeon performed previously during the same day using ﬁxed effects.
3.4.2 Estimation
We use an OLS regression model to assess the relationship between team performance and
different degrees of team familiarity:
lnDurationij = a + bOPj + dXi + hYj + qTij + eij (3.4)
Here, observations are at the level of patient i undergoing an operation conducted by
surgical team j including a surgeon, an assisting surgeon, an anesthesiologist, a circulating
nurse, and a scrub nurse. Duration denotes the procedure duration in minutes. We compute
the logarithm of Duration to estimate an exponential model, ensuring that our estimates are
not biased by experiences prior to observation period (Lapré and Tsikriktsis 2006).10
OP denotes a vector comprising operations performed on the same day before the
focal operation. We consider three measures of team familiarity. First, we distinguish past
operations based on the number of focal team members besides the surgeon. Our second
measure is deﬁned analogously, but groups operations performed by two or more focal
team members besides the surgeon in the same category. Finally, we use the number of
operations performed by any pair comprising the surgeon and any other member of the
10We obtain similar results with unlogged duration.
72focal team. We note that the number of operations performed by the surgeon and one other
member of the focal team is not equivalent to the number of operations conducted by any
pair comprising the surgeon and any other member of the focal team.11 A main objective of
this paper is to compare the impact of these measures on team performance.
Besides team familiarity, OP accounts for experience accumulated individually by each
of the team member on the day of the focal procedure. The surgeon’s individual experience
is captured by ﬁxed effects indicating how many operations the surgeon performed prior to
the focal procedure. For each team member besides the surgeon, we control for the number
of operations performed without the focal surgeon to capture individual experience.12
X in (3.4) is a vector of characteristics of patient i. Demographic information includes
20-year age groups, gender, race, and marital status speciﬁed as ﬁxed effects. To account for
patient severity, we adjust for the primary ICD-9 procedure code of the operation performed
by team j on patient i. In addition, we control for patient comorbidities by taking advantage
of the Charlson comorbidity index (Charlson et al. 1987, Quan et al. 2011). The Charlson
index is a widely used measure to adjust for the overall comorbidity severity of a patient.
Y denotes a vector of ﬁxed effects for each member of team j, accounting for any skill
variation that is constant during the observation period.13 Finally, T denotes a vector
comprising information about the timing of the operation of interest. It includes ﬁxed effects
for the hour of the day, the day of the week, and the month when the operation took place.14
In all models, we cluster standard errors by surgeons to account for potentially correlated
error terms.
11The ﬁrst measure of team familiarity stems exclusively from operations performed by the surgeon and one
— but no more — additional member of the focal team. By contrast, the pairwise measure of team familiarity
also includes operations involving the surgeon and several other focal team members.
12We do not adjust for the number of operations performed by the surgeon without any of the focal team
members. This variable is collinear once we control for ﬁxed effects capturing the number operations performed
by the surgeon on the day of the focal operation prior to the focal procedure and our measures of team
familiarity.
13We specify residual ﬁxed effects for members of the surgical team if these individuals appear fewer than
10 times in our ﬁnal analysis sample.
14We specify a ﬁxed effect for each month during the observation period. Thus, January 2008 is assigned to a
different ﬁxed effect than January 2009. Consequently, we do not use year ﬁxed effects due to collinearity.
73To explore whether team familiarity decays, we estimate (3.4) considering different time
periods for the deﬁnition of OP. We consider operations performed on the same day, within
1–10 days, and within 11–20 days before the focal operation, respectively. We combine these
measures in the same regression as follows:
lnDurationij = a + bOP0
j + gOP1 10
j + lOP11 20
j + dXi + hYj + qTij + eij (3.5)
Here, the superscripts above OP denote the time period considered when computing the
number of operations performed by one and two or more focal team members, respectively,
besides the surgeon. As before, we control for ﬁxed effects for the number of operations
performed by the surgeon on the same day prior of the focal procedure. We also include the
number of operations the surgeon performed with none of the focal team members within
1–10 and 11–20 days before the focal procedure and the number of operations performed by
any other team member without the surgeon during any of the three time periods.
Comparing the b, g, and l coefﬁcients shows to which extent team familiarity decays.
We note that operations involving two or more focal team members are composed differently
over time. That is, operations involving three or four of the team members besides the
surgeon are far more frequent on the day of the focal procedure. These differences need to
be taken into account when interpreting the coefﬁcient estimates.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Concentrated and Broad Team Familiarity
Table 3.3 reports how different types of operations affect procedure duration based on (3.4).
In Column 1 we distinguish the surgeon’s operations performed on the same day prior to
the focal procedure based on the number of team members who are also involved in the
focal operation. We ﬁnd that an operation’s impact on procedure duration steadily increases
with the number of team members involved in both the past and the focal procedure. The
reduction of procedure duration is especially pronounced between operations involving one
74Table 3.3: Team Familiarity and Procedure Duration
Ln(Duration)
(1) (2) (3)
Operations Surgeon & 1 Team Member -0.0225*** -0.0219***
(0.0047) (0.0047)
Operations Surgeon & 2 Team Members -0.0470***
(0.0065)
Operations Surgeon & 3 Team Members -0.0552***
(0.0047)
Operations Surgeon & 4 Team Members -0.0589***
(0.0055)
Operations Surgeon & 2+ Team Members -0.0533***
(0.0048)
Operations Pair of Surgeon & Team Member -0.0145***
(0.0015)
Adjusted R2 0.7445 0.7445 0.7443
Observations 25180 25180 25180
Mean Ln(Duration) 4.7609 4.7609 4.7609
Notes: This table reports how an operation performed previously on the same day impacts
the duration of the focal procedure. We distinguish past operations based on the number of
team members performing both the past and the focal procedure. Controls include patient
20-year age groups, gender, race, marital status, Charlson comorbidity index, primary
ICD-9 procedure code as well as hour, weekday, and month-year ﬁxed effects. For each
team member, we include ﬁxed effects and the number of operations not otherwise included.
Models are estimated by OLS and standard errors are clustered by surgeon. ***, **, and *
denote statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent level, respectively.
and two team members, respectively, besides the surgeon. Surgeries involving three or four
team members in addition to the surgeon do not reduce procedure duration by much more
than surgeries involving the surgeon and two team members.
Column 2 combines operations involving two or more focal other team members besides
the surgeon into a single operation category based on these ﬁndings. The resulting coefﬁ-
cient estimates are comparable to Column 1, suggesting that an operation involving one
team member in addition to the surgeon — reﬂecting concentrated familiarity — reduces
procedure duration by 2.2 percent. By contrast, broad familiarity — captured by operations
involving two or more team members besides the surgeon — reduces procedure duration
by 5.3 percent. Testing the hypothesis that these two coefﬁcients are equal using a Wald test
75-
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Figure 3.2: Teamwise and Pairwise Estimates
yields a F-statistic of 32.04 with a corresponding probability below one percent. Both con-
centrated and broad familiarity have a substantial impact on procedure duration, reducing
it approximately by 3 and 7 minutes per operation, respectively.
Column 3 reports how the number of pairwise collaborations between the surgeon and
any other focal team member on the same day prior to the focal operation affects procedure
duration. This measure has been used in previous research to measure the familiarity of
ﬂuid teams (Reagans et al. 2005, Huckman et al. 2009). A pairwise operation has a signiﬁcant
effect on procedure duration, reducing it by 1.5 percent. Comparing Columns 1 and 3
enables us to compare pairwise and teamwise estimates as deﬁned in Section 3.2.2. As
76highlighted in Figure 3.2, we ﬁnd that pairwise estimates underestimate the “true” impact
of team familiarity uncovered by teamwise estimates. The pairwise estimate documented in
Column 3 is much smaller than the coefﬁcient on operations of one team member besides
the surgeon reported in Column 1. Similarly, the coefﬁcients on operations involving the
surgeon and more than one team member in Column 1 are always smaller than estimates
obtained by multiplying the coefﬁcient on pairwise operations by the corresponding number
of team members, reﬂecting the number of additional pairwise collaborations.15
For robustness, we replicate the models presented in Columns 1 and 3 while weighing all
team members equally rather than considering the surgeon as the central team member. We
obtain coefﬁcient estimates of -0.0235, -0.0447, -0.0564, and -0.0591 for operations involving
two, three, four, or ﬁve of the focal team members, respectively. The coefﬁcient estimate
for the number of pairwise collaborations is -0.0047. All of these estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant at the one percent level. As before, the pairwise estimates do not capture the
returns to broad and concentrated familiarity documented by the teamwise estimates.16 For
instance, the pairwise estimates underestimate the beneﬁts to concentrated team familiarity
by a factor of almost ﬁve. We conclude that the mathematical relationships proposed by
(3.1) — at least in our setting — are not supported empirically.
3.5.2 Decay of Team Familiarity
In Table 3.4, we explore whether team familiarity decays.17 Column 1 reports the impact
of operations performed by the surgeon on the same day before the focal procedure. Both
concentrated and broad team familiarity have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on procedure
15Pairwise collaborations without the surgeon are irrelevant when the surgeon is considered the central team
member. Thus, an operation involving two, three, or four team members increases the number of pairwise
collaborations also by two, three, or four, respectively.
16According to the deﬁnition of (3.1), an operation involving two, three, four, and ﬁve team members leads to
one, three, six, and ten additional pairwise collaborations. Multiplying the pairwise coefﬁcient by these numbers
results in estimates of -0.0047, -0.0141, -0.0282, and -0.0470, respectively. These numbers do not correspond to
the estimates we obtain when allowing for concentrated and broad team familiarity.
17All speciﬁcations exclude observations for which operations performed 11–20 days before the focal
procedure are undeﬁned.
77duration, reducing it by 2.1 and 5.2 percent for each corresponding operation, respectively.
Column 2 considers operations performed within 1–10 days before the focal operation.
Concentrated team familiarity reduces procedure duration by 0.1 percent. This effect
is statistically insigniﬁcant. Meanwhile, broad familiarity reduces procedure duration
signiﬁcantly by 0.2 percent. Column 3 shows the estimates of an analogous speciﬁcation for
operations performed 11–20 days before the focal procedure. Here, concentrated familiarity
appears to have a more substantial and signiﬁcant impact than broad familiarity.
We combine operations performed during all time periods based on (3.5) in Column
4. We ﬁnd that coefﬁcients are broadly in line with the estimates documented in Columns
1 and 2, while the estimates analyzed individually in Column 3 appear smaller and less
signiﬁcant. Taken together, the estimates suggest that team familiarity developed on the day
prior to the focal procedure is especially helpful in reducing procedure duration. Operations
performed 1–10 days before the focal procedure are also beneﬁcial, but at a far lower level.
Clearly, the considerable difference between the impact of operations performed on the
same day and 1–10 days before the focal procedure could reﬂect an extraordinarily fast
decay in team familiarity. Two alternative explanations may mediate the extent of decay we
observe. First, operations involving three or four team members besides the surgeon are far
more frequent on the day of the focal procedure. As these teams beneﬁt slightly more from
having collaborated in the past — suggested by the estimates in Column 1 of Table 3.3 —
we would expect broad familiarity developed on the same day to be slightly more beneﬁcial
than broad familiarity developed 1–10 days before the focal procedure simply due to the
composition of operations developing broad team familiarity. Second, there is some that
returns to surgical team familiarity may be nonlinear (Xu et al. 2013). Thus, the higher
number of procedures performed by surgeons and other team members within 1–10 days
before the focal procedure may not translate to equivalent beneﬁts in team familiarity.
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803.5.3 Robustness
As discussed in Section 3.3, all of our analyses assume that the collaboration between
any pair comprising the surgeon and any other team member affects team familiarity
equally. We test the validity of this assumption in Table 3.5. In Column 1, we consider how
procedure duration is affected by an operation that was performed within 10 days of the
focal procedure and involved both the surgeon and the assisting surgeon. We obtain an
signiﬁcant estimate of -3.2 percent. We proceed similarly in Columns 2, 3, and 4, considering
the impact of an operation involving the anesthesiologist, scrub nurse, and circulating nurse
of the focal team, respectively, besides the surgeon performing the operation of interest.
Procedure duration is reduced by 2.6–2.8 percent by these operations.
In Column 5, we include operations performed by all of these pairs in the same regres-
sion. Importantly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that an operation performed by any
combination of the surgeon and any other member of the focal team reduces procedure
duration equally. We note, however, that operations performed by the surgeon jointly with
the assisting surgeon appear to build more team familiarity than other combinations.
We hypothesize that the impact of team familiarity on team performance may depend
on physician experience and procedure complexity. Perhaps, experienced surgeons have
learned to adapt faster to changing teams, resulting in less importance of team familiarity.
On the other hand, surgeon experience may extend the degree to which surgeons beneﬁt
from team familiarity. For instance, surgeons may have to learn when they can trust their
team. Complex procedures require better coordination among the team, making team
familiarity very beneﬁcial. Less complex procedures, however, offer a higher potential for
standardization of processes within a team.
We use two measures to test whether our results are robust to these factors. The ﬁrst
proxy is the number of days a surgeon has practiced since her board certiﬁcation. This
measure capture a surgeon’s overall experience with high precision, as the orthopedic
surgeons we observe typically have been working full-time in teaching hospitals since the
start of their career. In addition, we measure procedure complexity using the work relative
81Table 3.6: Impact of Physician and Procedure Characteristics on Team Familiarity
Ln(Duration)
(1) (2)
Operations Surgeon & 1 Team Member -0.0278*** -0.0241***
(0.0093) (0.0065)
Operations Surgeon & 2+ Team Members -0.0508*** -0.0580***
(0.0045) (0.0053)
Operations Surgeon & 1 Team Member ⇤ High Experience 0.0182
(0.0143)
Operations Surgeon & 2+ Team Members ⇤ High Experience 0.0064
(0.0095)
Operations Surgeon & 1 Team Member ⇤ High Complexity 0.0085
(0.0095)
Operations Surgeon & 2+ Team Members ⇤ High Complexity 0.0133*
(0.0076)
Adjusted R2 0.7686 0.7510
Observations 21350 20532
Mean Ln(Duration) 4.7317 4.7428
Notes: This table reports how the number of operations performed previously on the same day
impacts the duration of the focal procedure. We distinguish past operations based on the type
of team member performing both the past and the focal procedure. Experience is measured by
the number of years since the physician’s board certiﬁcation. Complexity is measured by the
work relative value unit used for Medicare reimbursement. Controls include patient 20-year
age groups, gender, race, marital status, Charlson comorbidity index, primary ICD-9 procedure
code as well as hour, weekday, and month-year ﬁxed effects. For each team member, we include
ﬁxed effects and the number of operations not otherwise included. Models are estimated by OLS
and standard errors are clustered by surgeon. ***, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
one, ﬁve, and ten percent level, respectively.
value unit — a reimbursement weight — deﬁned by Medicare for each CPT codes. We link
primary ICD-9 procedure codes to the most associated CPT code based on our data.
In Table 3.6, we interact concentrated and broad familiarity with high physician ex-
perience and procedure complexity. Physician experience and procedure complexity are
deﬁned to be high if they exceed the median value observed in our data. We distinguish
operations based on the surgeon’s experience in Column 1. Our ﬁndings suggest that both
concentrated and broad team familiarity tends to matter more for inexperienced surgeons,
although this effect is statistically insigniﬁcant. In Column 2, we explore the impact of
82procedure complexity on the relationship between team familiarity and procedure duration.
We ﬁnd that teams beneﬁt more from both concentrated and broad team familiarity when
they perform less complex procedures. Again, the results are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we conﬁrm the robustness of our results to outliers by excluding operations of
surgeons collaborating very frequently with other team members. To do so, we exclude
operations if the surgeon’s Herﬁndahl index with any type of team members is higher than
the 95 percentile. This percentile is determined based on the distribution of Herﬁndahl
indices with that team member type in our ﬁnal analysis sample. Results remain unaffected
by these exclusions. The coefﬁcients on concentrated and broad team familiarity are -0.0218
and -0.0523, respectively, resembling the estimates of the analogous speciﬁcation reported in
Column 2 of Table 3.3 while being statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
3.6 Conclusions
We demonstrate that the familiarity of a surgical team — developed in past operations on the
same day and 1–10 days before of the focal operation — reduces the duration of orthopedic
surgeries. The impact of a past operation on procedure duration depends on the number
team members associated with both that past operation and the focal operation. Broad
familiarity shared among several of the focal team members affects procedure duration by
more than twice as much as familiarity concentrated among two team members. We ﬁnd
that shared experience is especially beneﬁcial on the day of the focal procedure and has no
effect beyond 10 days before the focal operation.
The beneﬁts to increasing a team’s short-term familiarity are substantial. On the day
of the focal procedure, a prior operation developing concentrated and broad familiarity
reduces the expected procedure duration by about 3 and 7 minutes, respectively. Within
1–10 days before the focal procedure, an operation developing broad familiarity reduces
procedure duration still by about 20 seconds on average. Teams frequently collaborate
continuously on the day of the focal procedure, but only 10 percent of procedures performed
within 1–10 days before the focal procedure develop broad familiarity.
83Our analysis of the relative impact of concentrated and broad familiarity suggests that a
team’s performance increases nonlinearly with the volume of pairwise collaborations. We
ﬁnd that adding additional team members beyond two team members and the surgeon
does not have substantial beneﬁts. This result suggests that developing broad familiarity
does note require having all team members working together. Meanwhile, the beneﬁts of
broad familiarity can be replicated by twice the amount of concentrated familiarity. Put
differently, this paper provides some evidence for how team familiarity can be developed
fairly efﬁciently in pieces. That is, having some members of the team work together is
sufﬁcient to achieve high levels of team familiarity.
In practice, this ﬁnding may have important implications. While it is faster to improve
a team’s performance by developing broad familiarity, building concentrated familiarity
may be much more feasible. Across many settings, managers face a trade-off between
developing team familiarity and attuning scheduling of various individuals. In some
situations, focusing on the creation of concentrated rather than broad team familiarity may
be optimal. Speciﬁcally, hospitals may ﬁnd it much easier to align the schedules of two or
three members of a surgical team rather than ensuring that a surgical team performs as
many operations as possible in exactly the same composition.
Several limitations of our study deserve being mentioned. First, team composition in
our setting is just quasi-random rather than perfectly random. To the extent that surgeons
manage to obtain their preferred nurses and anesthesiologists, our results would be biased,
reﬂecting team selection rather than team familiarity. We are not overly concerned about
this issue, however, because of the speciﬁcities of our empirical setting and our focus on
whole teams rather than speciﬁc team members. A second limitation of this analysis is the
use of imprecise proxies, especially for procedure complexity. Despite ﬁnding inconclusive
evidence, we do not rule out the possibility the team speciﬁcity of individual performance
systematically varies with procedure complexity. Finally, more data in terms of years,
surgeons, and medical disciplines would be very helpful in analyzing whether our results
apply more broadly.
84References
Almond, D., J. J. Doyle, Jr., A. E. Kowalski, and H. Williams (2010). Estimating Marginal
Returns to Medical Care: Evidence from At-Risk Newborns. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 125(2), 591–634.
Angrist, J. D. and J.-S. Pischke (2008). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Anthony, D. L., M. B. Herndon, P. M. Gallagher, A. E. Barnato, J. P. W. Bynum, D. J. Gottlieb,
E. S. Fisher, and J. S. Skinner (2009). How Much Do Patients’ Preferences Contribute to
Resource Use? Health Affairs 28(3), 864–873.
Arrow, H. and J. E. McGrath (1995). Membership Dynamics in Groups at Work: A Theoretical
Framework. Research in Organizational Behavior 17, 373–373.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American
Economic Review 53(5), 941–973.
Baicker, K. and A. Chandra (2004). Medicare Spending, the Physician Workforce, and
Beneﬁciaries’ Quality of Care. Health Affairs W4, 184–197.
Bottle, A. and P. Aylin (2006). Mortality Associated with Delay in Operation after Hip
Fracture: Observational Study. BMJ 332(7547), 947–951.
Brauer, C. A., M. Coca-Perraillon, D. M. Cutler, and A. B. Rosen (2009). Incidence and
Mortality of Hip Fractures in the United States. JAMA 302(14), 1573–1579.
Chandra, A., D. Cutler, and Z. Song (2011). Who Ordered That? The Economics of Treatment
Choices in Medical Care. In M. V. Pauly, T. G. McGuire, and P. P. Barros (Eds.), Handbook
of Health Economics, Volume 2, pp. 397–432. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Chandra, A. and D. O. Staiger (2007). Productivity Spillovers in Healthcare: Evidence from
the Treatment of Heart Attacks. The Journal of Political Economy 115(1), 103–140.
Charlson, M. E., P. Pompei, K. L. Ales, and C. R. MacKenzie (1987). A New Method of
Classifying Prognostic Comorbidity in Longitudinal Studies: Development and Validation.
Journal of Chronic Diseases 40(5), 373–383.
Choudhry, N. K., G. M. Anderson, A. Laupacis, D. Ross-Degnan, S.-L. T. Normand, and
S. B. Soumerai (2006). Impact of Adverse Events on Prescribing Warfarin in Patients with
Atrial Fibrillation: Matched Pair Analysis. BMJ 332(7534), 141–145.
85Clemens, J. and J. D. Gottlieb (2014). Do Physicians’ Financial Incentives Affect Medical
Treatment and Patient Health? American Economic Review 104(4), 1320–1349.
Cromwell, J. and J. B. Mitchell (1986). Physician-Induced Demand for Surgery. Journal of
Health Economics 5(4), 293–313.
Cutler, D. M. (1995). The Incidence of Adverse Medical Outcomes Under Prospective
Payment. Econometrica 63(1), 29–50.
Dafny, L. S. (2005). How Do Hospitals Respond to Price Changes? American Economic
Review 95(5), 1525–1547.
Doyle, Jr., J. J. (2011). Returns to Local-Area Health Care Spending: Evidence from Health
Shocks to Patients Far From Home. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(3),
221–243.
Doyle, Jr., J. J., S. M. Ewer, and T. H. Wagner (2010). Returns to Physician Human Capital:
Evidence from Patients Randomized to Physician Teams. Journal of Health Economics 29(6),
866–882.
Dranove, D. and P. Wehner (1994). Physician-Induced Demand for Childbirths. Journal of
Health Economics 13(1), 61–73.
Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams. Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly 44(2), 350–383.
Edmondson, A. C., R. M. Bohmer, and G. P. Pisano (2001). Disrupted Routines: Team
Learning and New Technology Implementation in Hospitals. Administrative Science
Quarterly 46(4), 685–716.
Edmondson, A. C. and I. M. Nembhard (2009). Product Development and Learning in Project
Teams: The Challenges Are the Beneﬁts. Journal of Product Innovation Management 26(2),
123–138.
Edmondson, A. C., A. B. Winslow, R. M. Bohmer, and G. P. Pisano (2003). Learning How and
Learning What: Effects of Tacit and Codiﬁed Knowledge on Performance Improvement
Following Technology Adoption. Decision Sciences 34(2), 197–224.
Ellis, R. P. and T. G. McGuire (1986). Provider Behavior under Prospective Reimbursement:
Cost Sharing and Supply. Journal of Health Economics 5(2), 129–151.
Enthoven, A. C. (1980). Health Plan: The Only Practical Solution to the Soaring Cost of Medical
Care. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Fisher, E. S., D. E. Wennberg, T. A. Stukel, D. J. Gottlieb, F. L. Lucas, and É. L. Pinder (2003).
The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes
and Satisfaction with Care. Annals of Internal Medicine 138(4), 288–298.
Fox, H., J. Pooler, D. Prothero, and G. Bannister (1994). Factors Affecting the Outcome after
Proximal Femoral Fractures. Injury 25(5), 297–300.
86Fuchs, V. R. (1978). The Supply of Surgeons and the Demand for Operations. Journal of
Human Resources 13, 35–56.
Fuchs, V. R. (2004). More Variation in Use of Care, More Flat-Of-The-Curve Medicine. Health
Affairs V AR, 104–107.
Glover, J. A. (1938). The Incidence of Tonsillectomy in School Children. Proceedings of the
Royal Society of Medicine 31(10), 1219–1236.
Gruber, J. and M. Owings (1996). Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section
Delivery. RAND Journal of Economics 27(1), 99–123.
Holmberg, S., R. Kalén, and K.-G. Thorngren (1987). Treatment and Outcome of Femoral
Neck Fractures: An Analysis of 2418 Patients Admitted from Their Own Homes. Clinical
Orthopaedics and Related Research 218, 42–52.
Huckman, R. S. and G. P. Pisano (2006). The Firm Speciﬁcity of Individual Performance:
Evidence from Cardiac Surgery. Management Science 52(4), 473–488.
Huckman, R. S. and B. R. Staats (2011). Fluid Tasks and Fluid Teams: The Impact of
Diversity in Experience and Team Familiarity on Team Performance. Manufacturing &
Service Operations Management 13(3), 310–328.
Huckman, R. S., B. R. Staats, and D. M. Upton (2009). Team Familiarity, Role Experience,
and Performance: Evidence from Indian Software Services. Management Science 55(1),
85–100.
Katz, R. (1982). The Effects of Group Longevity on Project Communication and Performance.
Administrative Science Quarterly 27(1), 81–104.
Kessler, S., S. Kinkel, W. Kafer, W. Puhl, and T. Schochat (2003). Inﬂuence of Operation
Duration on Perioperative Morbidity in Revision Total Hip Arthroplasty. Acta Orthopaedica
Belgica 69(4), 328–333.
Khan, S. K., S. Kalra, A. Khanna, M. M. Thiruvengada, and M. J. Parker (2009). Timing
of Surgery for Hip Fractures: A Systematic Review of 52 Published Studies Involving
291,413 Patients. Injury 40(7), 692–697.
Lapré, M. A. and N. Tsikriktsis (2006). Organizational Learning Curves for Customer
Dissatisfaction: Heterogeneity across Airlines. Management Science 52(3), 352–366.
Leong, G., J. Wilson, and A. Charlett (2006). Duration of Operation as a Risk Factor
for Surgical Site Infection: Comparison of English and US Data. Journal of Hospital
Infection 63(3), 255–262.
McClellan, M. (2011). Reforming Payments to Healthcare Providers: The Key to Slowing
Healthcare Cost Growth while Improving Quality? Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(2),
69–92.
87McClellan, M., B. J. McNeil, and J. P. Newhouse (1994). Does More Intensive Treatment of
Acute Myocardial Infarction in the Elderly Reduce Mortality? Analysis using Instrumental
Variables. JAMA 272(11), 859–866.
Moran, C. G., R. T. Wenn, M. Sikand, and A. M. Taylor (2005). Early Mortality after Hip
Fracture: Is Delay before Surgery Important? Journal of Bone & Joint Surgery, American 87(3),
483–489.
O’Hare, A. M., R. A. Rodriguez, S. M. Hailpern, E. B. Larson, and M. K. Tamura (2010).
Regional Variation in Health Care Intensity and Treatment Practices for End-Stage Renal
Disease in Older Adults. JAMA 304(2), 180–186.
Okike, K., O. C. Lee, H. Makanji, M. B. Harris, and M. S. Vrahas (2013). Factors Associated
with the Decision for Operative versus Non-Operative Treatment of Displaced Proximal
Humerus Fractures in the Elderly. Injury 44(4), 448–455.
Ong, K. L., E. Lau, M. Manley, and S. M. Kurtz (2008). Effect of Procedure Duration on
Total Hip Arthroplasty and Total Knee Arthroplasty Survivorship in the United States
Medicare Population. Journal of Arthroplasty 23(6), 127–132.
Pisano, G. P., R. M. Bohmer, and A. C. Edmondson (2001). Organizational Differences in
Rates of Learning: Evidence from the Adoption of Minimally Invasive Cardiac Surgery.
Management Science 47(6), 752–768.
Quan, H., B. Li, C. M. Couris, K. Fushimi, P. Graham, P. Hider, J.-M. Januel, and V. Sun-
dararajan (2011). Updating and Validating the Charlson Comorbidity Index and Score for
Risk Adjustment in Hospital Discharge Abstracts Using Data from 6 countries. American
Journal of Epidemiology 173(6), 676–682.
Reagans, R., L. Argote, and D. Brooks (2005). Individual Experience and Experience Working
Together: Predicting Learning Rates from Knowing Who Knows What and Knowing How
to Work Together. Management Science 51(6), 869–881.
Rogers, F. B., S. R. Shackford, and M. S. Keller (1995). Early Fixation Reduces Morbidity
and Mortality in Elderly Patients with Hip Fractures from Low-Impact Falls. Journal of
Trauma-Injury, Infection, and Critical Care 39(2), 261–265.
Schilling, M. A., P. Vidal, R. E. Ployhart, and A. Marangoni (2003). Learning by Doing
Something Else: Variation, Relatedness, and the Learning Curve. Management Science 49(1),
39–56.
Shiga, T., Z. Wajima, and Y. Ohe (2008). Is Operative Delay Associated with Increased Mor-
tality of Hip Fracture Patients? Systematic Review, Meta-Analysis, and Meta-Regression.
Canadian Journal of Anesthesia 55(3), 146–154.
Sinclair, G., S. Klepper, and W. Cohen (2000). What’s Experience Got to Do with It? Sources
of Cost Reduction in a Large Specialty Chemicals Producer. Management Science 46(1),
28–45.
88Sommers, B. D., C. J. Beard, A. V. D’Amico, I. Kaplan, J. P. Richie, and R. J. Zeckhauser
(2008). Predictors of Patient Preferences and Treatment Choices for Localized Prostate
Cancer. Cancer 113(8), 2058–2067.
Song, Y., J. Skinner, J. Bynum, J. Sutherland, J. E. Wennberg, and E. S. Fisher (2010). Regional
Variations in Diagnostic Practices. New England Journal of Medicine 363(1), 45–53.
Staiger, D. and J. H. Stock (1997). Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments.
Econometrica 65(3), 557–586.
Stock, J. H., J. H. Wright, and M. Yogo (2002). A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Iden-
tiﬁcation in Generalized Method of Moments. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 20(4),
518–529.
Welch, H. G., S. M. Sharp, D. J. Gottlieb, J. S. Skinner, and J. E. Wennberg (2011). Geographic
Variation in Diagnosis Frequency and Risk of Death among Medicare Beneﬁciaries.
JAMA 305(11), 1113–1118.
Weller, I., E. Wai, S. Jaglal, and H. Kreder (2005). The Effect of Hospital Type and Surgi-
cal Delay on Mortality after Surgery for Hip Fracture. Journal of Bone & Joint Surgery,
British 87(3), 361–366.
Wennberg, J. and A. Gittelsohn (1973). Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery.
Science 182(4117), 1102–1108.
Williams, Gerald R., J., C. A. Rockwood, Jr., L. U. Bigliani, J. P. Iannotti, and W. Stanwood
(2004). Rotator Cuff Tears: Why Do We Repair Them? Journal of Bone & Joint Surgery,
American 86(12), 2764–2776.
Wright, P. G. (1928). Tariff on Animal and Vegetable Oils. New York, NY: MacMillan.
Xu, R., M. J. Carty, D. P. Orgill, S. R. Lipsitz, and A. Duclos (2013). The Teaming Curve:
A Longitudinal Study of the Inﬂuence of Surgical Team Familiarity on Operative Time.
Annals of Surgery 258(6), 953–957.
89